Nothing very interesting, some checkpatch inspired stuff,
some other things.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c | 6 +++---
net/mac80211/main.c | 2 +-
net/mac80211/mesh.c | 2 +-
net/mac80211/rc80211_pid.h | 2 +-
net/mac80211/rx.c | 24 +++++++++++++-----------
net/mac80211/sta_info.c | 4 ++--
net/mac80211/wep.c | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
net/mac80211/wep.h | 2 +-
net/mac80211/wpa.c | 29 ++++++++++-------------------
9 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
--- everything.orig/net/mac80211/wep.c 2008-10-07 11:26:52.000000000 +0200
+++ everything/net/mac80211/wep.c 2008-10-07 11:27:00.000000000 +0200
@@ -49,17 +49,19 @@ void ieee80211_wep_free(struct ieee80211
crypto_free_blkcipher(local->wep_rx_tfm);
}
-static inline int ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(u32 iv, int keylen)
+static inline bool ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(u32 iv, int keylen)
{
- /* Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir have reported weaknesses in the
+ /*
+ * Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir have reported weaknesses in the
* key scheduling algorithm of RC4. At least IVs (KeyByte + 3,
- * 0xff, N) can be used to speedup attacks, so avoid using them. */
+ * 0xff, N) can be used to speedup attacks, so avoid using them.
+ */
if ((iv & 0xff00) == 0xff00) {
u8 B = (iv >> 16) & 0xff;
if (B >= 3 && B < 3 + keylen)
- return 1;
+ return true;
}
- return 0;
+ return false;
}
@@ -268,7 +270,7 @@ int ieee80211_wep_decrypt(struct ieee802
}
-u8 * ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key)
+bool ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key)
{
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
unsigned int hdrlen;
@@ -276,16 +278,13 @@ u8 * ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_
u32 iv;
if (!ieee80211_has_protected(hdr->frame_control))
- return NULL;
+ return false;
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
ivpos = skb->data + hdrlen;
iv = (ivpos[0] << 16) | (ivpos[1] << 8) | ivpos[2];
- if (ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(iv, key->conf.keylen))
- return ivpos;
-
- return NULL;
+ return ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(iv, key->conf.keylen);
}
ieee80211_rx_result
@@ -332,6 +331,8 @@ static int wep_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80
ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_wep_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
+ int i;
+
ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
if (wep_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->skb) < 0) {
@@ -340,9 +341,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_wep_encrypt(struct ieee
}
if (tx->extra_frag) {
- int i;
for (i = 0; i < tx->num_extra_frag; i++) {
- if (wep_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]) < 0) {
+ if (wep_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i])) {
I802_DEBUG_INC(tx->local->
tx_handlers_drop_wep);
return TX_DROP;
--- everything.orig/net/mac80211/wep.h 2008-10-07 11:26:51.000000000 +0200
+++ everything/net/mac80211/wep.h 2008-10-07 11:27:00.000000000 +0200
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ int ieee80211_wep_encrypt(struct ieee802
struct ieee80211_key *key);
int ieee80211_wep_decrypt(struct ieee80211_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct ieee80211_key *key);
-u8 *ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key);
+bool ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key);
ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_crypto_wep_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx);
--- everything.orig/net/mac80211/wpa.c 2008-10-07 11:26:52.000000000 +0200
+++ everything/net/mac80211/wpa.c 2008-10-07 11:27:00.000000000 +0200
@@ -49,8 +49,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ie
!(tx->flags & IEEE80211_TX_FRAGMENTED) &&
!(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) &&
!wpa_test) {
- /* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for Michael MIC
- */
+ /* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for MMIC */
return TX_CONTINUE;
}
@@ -67,8 +66,6 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ie
#else
authenticator = 1;
#endif
- /* At this point we know we're using ALG_TKIP. To get the MIC key
- * we now will rely on the offset from the ieee80211_key_conf::key */
key_offset = authenticator ?
NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY :
NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY;
@@ -92,9 +89,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct
int authenticator = 1, wpa_test = 0;
DECLARE_MAC_BUF(mac);
- /*
- * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it
- */
+ /* No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it */
if (rx->status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED)
return RX_CONTINUE;
@@ -116,8 +111,6 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct
#else
authenticator = 1;
#endif
- /* At this point we know we're using ALG_TKIP. To get the MIC key
- * we now will rely on the offset from the ieee80211_key_conf::key */
key_offset = authenticator ?
NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY :
NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY;
@@ -205,6 +198,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
+ int i;
ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
@@ -212,9 +206,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct iee
return TX_DROP;
if (tx->extra_frag) {
- int i;
for (i = 0; i < tx->num_extra_frag; i++) {
- if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]) < 0)
+ if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]))
return TX_DROP;
}
}
@@ -353,7 +346,7 @@ static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr,
}
-static inline int ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
+static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
{
pn[0] = hdr[7];
pn[1] = hdr[6];
@@ -361,7 +354,6 @@ static inline int ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8
pn[3] = hdr[4];
pn[4] = hdr[1];
pn[5] = hdr[0];
- return (hdr[3] >> 6) & 0x03;
}
@@ -379,7 +371,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8
if ((tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) &&
!(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) {
- /* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for CCMP "
+ /* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for CCMP
* header or MIC fields */
info->control.hw_key = &tx->key->conf;
return 0;
@@ -432,6 +424,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
+ int i;
ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
@@ -439,9 +432,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct iee
return TX_DROP;
if (tx->extra_frag) {
- int i;
for (i = 0; i < tx->num_extra_frag; i++) {
- if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]) < 0)
+ if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]))
return TX_DROP;
}
}
@@ -474,7 +466,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct iee
(rx->status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED))
return RX_CONTINUE;
- (void) ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
+ ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[rx->queue], CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) {
key->u.ccmp.replays++;
@@ -489,9 +481,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct iee
key->u.ccmp.tfm, key->u.ccmp.rx_crypto_buf,
skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN, data_len,
skb->data + skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN,
- skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN)) {
+ skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
- }
}
memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[rx->queue], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
--- everything.orig/net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c 2008-10-07 11:26:59.000000000 +0200
+++ everything/net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c 2008-10-07 11:27:00.000000000 +0200
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static ssize_t sta_agg_status_read(struc
p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n DTKN:");
for (i = 0; i < STA_TID_NUM; i++)
p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "%5d",
- sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_rx[i]?
+ sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_rx[i] ?
sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_rx[i]->dialog_token : 0);
p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n TX :");
@@ -148,13 +148,13 @@ static ssize_t sta_agg_status_read(struc
p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n DTKN:");
for (i = 0; i < STA_TID_NUM; i++)
p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "%5d",
- sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_tx[i]?
+ sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_tx[i] ?
sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_tx[i]->dialog_token : 0);
p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n SSN :");
for (i = 0; i < STA_TID_NUM; i++)
p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "%5d",
- sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_tx[i]?
+ sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_tx[i] ?
sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_tx[i]->ssn : 0);
p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n");
--- everything.orig/net/mac80211/main.c 2008-10-07 11:26:51.000000000 +0200
+++ everything/net/mac80211/main.c 2008-10-07 11:27:00.000000000 +0200
@@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@ static int __init ieee80211_init(void)
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct ieee80211_tx_info) > sizeof(skb->cb));
BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct ieee80211_tx_info, driver_data) +
- IEEE80211_TX_INFO_DRIVER_DATA_SIZE > sizeof(skb->cb));
+ IEEE80211_TX_INFO_DRIVER_DATA_SIZE > sizeof(skb->cb));
ret = rc80211_pid_init();
if (ret)
--- everything.orig/net/mac80211/mesh.c 2008-10-07 11:26:51.000000000 +0200
+++ everything/net/mac80211/mesh.c 2008-10-07 11:27:00.000000000 +0200
@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ static void ieee80211_mesh_rx_bcn_presp(
size_t len,
struct ieee80211_rx_status *rx_status)
{
- struct ieee80211_local *local= sdata->local;
+ struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
struct ieee802_11_elems elems;
struct ieee80211_channel *channel;
u64 supp_rates = 0;
--- everything.orig/net/mac80211/rc80211_pid.h 2008-10-07 11:26:51.000000000 +0200
+++ everything/net/mac80211/rc80211_pid.h 2008-10-07 11:27:00.000000000 +0200
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
/* Arithmetic right shift for positive and negative values for ISO C. */
#define RC_PID_DO_ARITH_RIGHT_SHIFT(x, y) \
- (x) < 0 ? -((-(x)) >> (y)) : (x) >> (y)
+ ((x) < 0 ? -((-(x)) >> (y)) : (x) >> (y))
enum rc_pid_event_type {
RC_PID_EVENT_TYPE_TX_STATUS,
--- everything.orig/net/mac80211/rx.c 2008-10-07 11:26:57.000000000 +0200
+++ everything/net/mac80211/rx.c 2008-10-07 11:27:00.000000000 +0200
@@ -26,10 +26,11 @@
#include "tkip.h"
#include "wme.h"
-u8 ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder_buf(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
- struct tid_ampdu_rx *tid_agg_rx,
- struct sk_buff *skb, u16 mpdu_seq_num,
- int bar_req);
+static u8 ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder_buf(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
+ struct tid_ampdu_rx *tid_agg_rx,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u16 mpdu_seq_num,
+ int bar_req);
/*
* monitor mode reception
*
@@ -2000,17 +2001,17 @@ static void __ieee80211_rx_handle_packet
static inline int seq_less(u16 sq1, u16 sq2)
{
- return (((sq1 - sq2) & SEQ_MASK) > (SEQ_MODULO >> 1));
+ return ((sq1 - sq2) & SEQ_MASK) > (SEQ_MODULO >> 1);
}
static inline u16 seq_inc(u16 sq)
{
- return ((sq + 1) & SEQ_MASK);
+ return (sq + 1) & SEQ_MASK;
}
static inline u16 seq_sub(u16 sq1, u16 sq2)
{
- return ((sq1 - sq2) & SEQ_MASK);
+ return (sq1 - sq2) & SEQ_MASK;
}
@@ -2018,10 +2019,11 @@ static inline u16 seq_sub(u16 sq1, u16 s
* As it function blongs to Rx path it must be called with
* the proper rcu_read_lock protection for its flow.
*/
-u8 ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder_buf(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
- struct tid_ampdu_rx *tid_agg_rx,
- struct sk_buff *skb, u16 mpdu_seq_num,
- int bar_req)
+static u8 ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder_buf(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
+ struct tid_ampdu_rx *tid_agg_rx,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u16 mpdu_seq_num,
+ int bar_req)
{
struct ieee80211_local *local = hw_to_local(hw);
struct ieee80211_rx_status status;
--- everything.orig/net/mac80211/sta_info.c 2008-10-07 11:26:58.000000000 +0200
+++ everything/net/mac80211/sta_info.c 2008-10-07 11:27:00.000000000 +0200
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ int sta_info_insert(struct sta_info *sta
}
if (WARN_ON(compare_ether_addr(sta->sta.addr, sdata->dev->dev_addr) == 0 ||
- is_multicast_ether_addr(sta->sta.addr))) {
+ is_multicast_ether_addr(sta->sta.addr))) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
@@ -830,7 +830,7 @@ void ieee80211_sta_expire(struct ieee802
}
struct ieee80211_sta *ieee80211_find_sta(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
- const u8 *addr)
+ const u8 *addr)
{
struct sta_info *sta = sta_info_get(hw_to_local(hw), addr);
--
--
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