Am 28.08.18 um 10:48 schrieb Johannes Berg:
> On Tue, 2018-08-14 at 12:42 +0200, Alexander Wetzel wrote:
>>
>> + /* PTK only using key ID 0 needs special handling on rekey */
>> + if (new_key && sta && ptk0rekey) {
>> + local = old_key->local;
>> + sdata = old_key->sdata;
>> +
>> + /* Stop TX till we are on the new key */
>> + old_key->flags |= KEY_FLAG_TAINTED;
>> + ieee80211_clear_fast_xmit(sta);
>> +
>> + /* Aggregation sessions during rekey are complicated due to
>> + * the reorder buffer. Side step that by blocking aggregation
>> + * and tear down running connections.
>> + */
>> + if (ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, AMPDU_AGGREGATION)) {
>> + set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA);
>> + ieee80211_sta_tear_down_BA_sessions(sta,
>> + AGG_STOP_LOCAL_REQUEST);
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (new_key->local->ops->replace_key) {
>> + ret = drv_replace_key(old_key->local, sdata,
>> + &sta->sta, &old_key->conf,
>> + &new_key->conf);
>> + if (!ret)
>> + new_key->flags |= KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
>> + else
>> + sdata_err(sdata,
>> + "failed to replace key (%d) for " \
>> + "STA (%pM) in hardware: ret=(%d)\n",
>> + old_key->conf.keyidx,
>> + sta->sta.addr,
>> + ret);
>> +
>> + old_key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
>> + } else {
>> + sdata_info(sdata,
>> + "Userspace requested a PTK rekey for STA " \
>> + "%pM while feature not supported! " \
>> + "This may leak clear text packets or " \
>> + "freeze the connection.",
>> + sta->sta.addr);
>
> This seems a bit weird - we know a likely dangerous thing is happening
> and only print an info message? Why not just prevent this in the first
> place?
The next version will upgrade that to a warning.
Rejecting it outright will break things for users with card/drivers
where rekey currently is working. There is no error error message for
"please re-associate as quick as you can" and tricking userspace to do
that across versions and implementations would need code at I do not see
belonging into the kernel. Here what I wrote in the cover letter of the
v4 version of the patch about this decision:
> I do not see an acceptable way from the kernel to trigger a fast
> reconnect. wpa_supplicant e.g. has some special code handling errors
> during a 4-way-handshake differently. I assume we would have to add
> code detecting if we are running as AP, Station Infrastructure, Ad-Hoc
> or Mesh and then find and spoof an error which allows the userspace to
> reconnect fast. For multiple different userspace implementations and
> the different versions of them.
> And we'll have that mess in the kernel for basically forever...
> Seems to be a clear no go, correct?
>
> So this patch (series) is giving up on a quick fix and will allow
> broken rekeys to continue. It is instead providing an updated API for
> both the userspace and the drivers to also do it correctly. Users
> running a userspace not aware of the new API will get some
> improvements but may
> still leak cleartext packets and have connection freezes till we get
> an updated userspace rolled out. On the plus side users running
> updated userspace won't be able to rekey connections any longer,
> avoiding the issues even with unpatched kernels.
Of course I may miss something and there may be a good way to get that
working anyhow. But for me it looks like we either have to accept
something which looks like a regression to users or accept that some
drivers may not be fixed with this patch alone and will need either an
updated userspace or drivers.
Alexander
