On Mon, 2015-08-31 at 22:52 -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > On Fri, Aug 28, 2015 at 10:03 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@xxxxxxxx> > wrote: > > On Fri, Aug 28, 2015 at 06:26:05PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > > > On Fri, Aug 28, 2015 at 7:20 AM, Roberts, William C > > > <william.c.roberts@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > Even triggered updates make sense, since you can at least have > > > > some form of trust > > > > of where that binary policy came from. > > > > > > It isn't always that simple, see my earlier comments about > > > customization and manipulation by the policy loading tools. > > > > If the customization of the data is done in kernel then the kernel > > can *first* verify the file's signature prior to doing any data > > modification. If userspace does the modification then the signature > > stuff won't work unless the tool will have access to the MOK and > > can > > sign it pre-flight to the kernel selinuxfs. > > Yes, userspace does the modification. > > > > > Huh, not following? Perhaps, I am not following what your > > > > laying down here. > > > > > > > > Right now there is no signing on the selinux policy file. We > > > > should be able > > > > to just use the firmware signing api's as is (I have not looked > > > > on linux-next yet) > > > > to unpack the blob. > > > > > > I haven't looked at the existing fw signing hook in any detail to > > > be > > > able to comment on its use as a policy verification hook. As > > > long as > > > we preserve backwards compatibility and don't introduce a new > > > mechanism/API for loading SELinux policy I doubt I would have any > > > objections. > > > > You'd just have to implement a permissive model as we are with the > > fw signing. No radical customizations, except one thing to note is > > that on the fw signing side of things we're going to have the > > signature > > of the file *detached* in separate file. I think what you're > > alluding > > to is the issue of where that signature would be stuff in the > > SELinux > > policy file and its correct that you'd need to address that. You > > could > > just borrow the kernel's model and reader / sucker that strips out > > the > > signature. Another possibility would be two files but then I guess > > you'd need a trigger to annotate both are in place. > > Yes, there are lots of way we could solve the signed policy format > issue, I just don't have one in mind at this moment. Also, to be > honest, there are enough limitations to signing SELinux policies that > this isn't very high on my personal SELinux priority list. Hard for me to argue on your priorities. I will point out for others interested, userspace does usually need to munge policy. It's typically only needed when the policy on disk is say v35, the toolchain understands v35+ but the kernel only understands v34. The userspace tools will downgrade the policy before it loads shoves in the blob. If the kernel understands v35 and the policy is v35 you can (I think) actually use cat to load the policy. So certainly this is a perfectly reasonable restriction on some systems, but we have quite often run into user who don't update their kernel but do update their userspace and any signing would be pretty much impossible for them... -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-wireless" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
