On Tue, May 19, 2015 at 10:02:32PM +0200, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote: > This begs the question on how we'd manage keys for firmware signing on > linux-firmare. Since the keys are x509 keys we need a CA. Based on some initial > discussions it would seem we'd need the Linux Foundation to create a key, this > would be embedded in the kernel and that key would be used to sign Kyle's key. > Kyle would in turn use his key for signing linux-firmware files. David, Kyle, > did I summarize this correctly ? I raised the question of key revocation when we discussed this on irc, but it wasn't answered to my satisfaction. If a key signed by the kernel-embedded key is compromised, how can that key be revoked so that it is no longer trusted? Someone mentioned UEFI blacklists, which I don't know much about, but not all systems have UEFI. The only reliable option that comes to mind for me is an in-kernel blacklist of keys which should no longer be trusted. Seth -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-wireless" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
