On 12/27/2014 05:57 AM, Christian Lamparter wrote:
Alright, here's lunch [for the people in CET].
On Saturday, December 27, 2014 11:10:16 AM Christian Lamparter wrote:
On Saturday, December 27, 2014 12:15:58 AM Christopher Chavez wrote:
My bisection led to a branch commit d17ec4d as the "bad" commit.
Rather than finding out where the bisection went bad, I added
code to check skb->tail, skb->end, and the length to be added.
At the time of the call that panics, there are 6 bytes between
tail and end with 8 bytes needed.
I will be looking for the place where the driver calculates how
large the skb should be.
From looking at a other patch from that time and context. I think: "
commit ca34e3b5c808385b175650605faa29e71e91991b
Author: Ido Yariv <ido@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue Jul 29 15:38:53 2014 +0300
mac80211: Fix accounting of the tailroom-needed counter [1]
[...]
I can think of several ways of dealing with this issue:
2. add extra IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_ or HW_FLAG to restore the old behavior.
This should be possible and relatively simple. But we/I have to be
especially careful to differentiate properly between the old and new.
[i.e.: I need to know what the deal is behind:
IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT in this case? Looks like it can
be ignored?]
---
[Note: for convenience this patch is rolled into one for now -
if it and the concept works, I'll make two parts. one for p54
one for mac80211 [both -stable]. It would be great if someone
could proofread the commit message though - and provide
"tested-by" tags if possible]
mac80211: re-enable tailroom resizing when needed for hardware encryption
The patch "mac80211: Fix accounting of the tailroom-needed counter" reduced
the overhead associated with unnecessary resizing of outgoing frames.
Unfortunately this change broke the assumption that there is always enough
tailroom and this in turn caused p54* to panic.
Reported-by: Christopher Chavez <chrischavez@xxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/p54/main.c b/drivers/net/wireless/p54/main.c
index 97aeff0..b877c7f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/p54/main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/p54/main.c
@@ -751,6 +751,7 @@ struct ieee80211_hw *p54_init_common(size_t priv_data_len)
IEEE80211_HW_SUPPORTS_PS |
IEEE80211_HW_PS_NULLFUNC_STACK |
IEEE80211_HW_MFP_CAPABLE |
+ IEEE80211_HW_TAILROOM_CRYPTO |
IEEE80211_HW_REPORTS_TX_ACK_STATUS;
dev->wiphy->interface_modes = BIT(NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION) |
diff --git a/include/net/mac80211.h b/include/net/mac80211.h
index 58d719d..c04ac04 100644
--- a/include/net/mac80211.h
+++ b/include/net/mac80211.h
@@ -1270,8 +1270,11 @@ struct ieee80211_vif *wdev_to_ieee80211_vif(struct wireless_dev *wdev);
*
* @IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV: This flag should be set by the
* driver to indicate that it requires IV generation for this
- * particular key. Setting this flag does not necessarily mean that SKBs
- * will have sufficient tailroom for ICV or MIC.
+ * particular key. Setting this flag does not mean that SKBs will
+ * have sufficient tailroom for ICV or MIC. If additional tailroom
+ * tailroom needs to be reserved for the ICV or MIC, the driver
+ * should also set the hardware feature flag:
+ * %IEEE80211_HW_TAILROOM_CRYPTO.
* @IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC: This flag should be set by
* the driver for a TKIP key if it requires Michael MIC
* generation in software.
@@ -1583,6 +1586,10 @@ struct ieee80211_tx_control {
* @IEEE80211_HW_MFP_CAPABLE:
* Hardware supports management frame protection (MFP, IEEE 802.11w).
*
+ * @IEEE80211_HW_TAILROOM_CRYPTO: The driver would like to have sufficient
+ * tailroom for ICV or MIC for outgoing frames in order to perform
+ * hardware encryption without any additional resizing overhead.
+ *
* @IEEE80211_HW_SUPPORTS_UAPSD:
* Hardware supports Unscheduled Automatic Power Save Delivery
* (U-APSD) in managed mode. The mode is configured with
@@ -1673,7 +1680,7 @@ enum ieee80211_hw_flags {
IEEE80211_HW_MFP_CAPABLE = 1<<13,
IEEE80211_HW_WANT_MONITOR_VIF = 1<<14,
IEEE80211_HW_NO_AUTO_VIF = 1<<15,
- /* free slot */
+ IEEE80211_HW_TAILROOM_CRYPTO = 1<<16,
IEEE80211_HW_SUPPORTS_UAPSD = 1<<17,
IEEE80211_HW_REPORTS_TX_ACK_STATUS = 1<<18,
IEEE80211_HW_CONNECTION_MONITOR = 1<<19,
diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.c b/net/mac80211/key.c
index 0bb7038..c3e9a9a 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/key.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.c
@@ -140,7 +140,8 @@ static int ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key)
if (!ret) {
key->flags |= KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
- if (!(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC))
+ if (!((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) ||
+ (key->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_TAILROOM_CRYPTO)))
sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt--;
WARN_ON((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
@@ -188,7 +189,8 @@ static void ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key)
sta = key->sta;
sdata = key->sdata;
- if (!(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC))
+ if (!((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) ||
+ (key->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_TAILROOM_CRYPTO)))
increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
ret = drv_set_key(key->local, DISABLE_KEY, sdata,
@@ -884,7 +886,8 @@ void ieee80211_remove_key(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf)
if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) {
key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
- if (!(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC))
+ if (!((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) ||
+ (key->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_TAILROOM_CRYPTO)))
increment_tailroom_need_count(key->sdata);
}
Christian,
I had redone the bisection and found that ca34e3b was the bad commit. That was
late last night (CST - UTC-5). I was pleased to find your patch in my mailbox
this morning.
With your patch, my system has survived for about 2 hours, whereas it would have
failed in 2 minutes or less. You can add
Tested-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
I think this needs to be applied to 3.{17-19}.
Thanks,
Larry
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