On Tue, Oct 12, 2021 at 02:18:01PM -0700, Andi Kleen wrote: > > > Interesting. VT-d tradeoffs ... what are they? > > The connection to the device is not encrypted and also not authenticated. > > This is different that even talking to the (untrusted) host through shared > memory where you at least still have a common key. Well it's different sure enough but how is talking to host less secure? Cold boot attacks and such? > > Allowing hypervisor to write into BIOS looks like it will > > trivially lead to code execution, won't it? > > This is not about BIOS code executing. While the guest firmware runs it is > protected of course. This is for BIOS structures like ACPI tables that are > mapped by Linux. While AML can run byte code it can normally not write to > arbitrary memory. I thought you basically create an OperationRegion of SystemMemory type, and off you go. Maybe the OSPM in Linux is clever and protects some memory, I wouldn't know. > The risk is more that all the Linux code dealing with this hasn't been > hardened to deal with malicious input. > > -Andi -- MST _______________________________________________ Virtualization mailing list Virtualization@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/virtualization
