On Thu, Jun 17, 2021 at 01:10:04PM +0800, Xie Yongji wrote:
> This ensures that we will not use an invalid block size
> in config space (might come from an untrusted device).
>
> Signed-off-by: Xie Yongji <xieyongji@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> drivers/block/virtio_blk.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++------
> 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c b/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c
> index b9fa3ef5b57c..bbdae989f1ea 100644
> --- a/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c
> +++ b/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c
> @@ -696,6 +696,28 @@ static const struct blk_mq_ops virtio_mq_ops = {
> static unsigned int virtblk_queue_depth;
> module_param_named(queue_depth, virtblk_queue_depth, uint, 0444);
>
> +static int virtblk_validate(struct virtio_device *vdev)
> +{
> + u32 blk_size;
> +
> + if (!vdev->config->get) {
> + dev_err(&vdev->dev, "%s failure: config access disabled\n",
> + __func__);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + if (!virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_BLK_F_BLK_SIZE))
> + return 0;
> +
> + blk_size = virtio_cread32(vdev,
> + offsetof(struct virtio_blk_config, blk_size));
> +
> + if (blk_size < SECTOR_SIZE || blk_size > PAGE_SIZE)
> + __virtio_clear_bit(vdev, VIRTIO_BLK_F_BLK_SIZE);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
I saw Michael asked for .validate() in v2. I would prefer to keep
everything in virtblk_probe() instead of adding .validate() because:
- There is a race condition that an untrusted device can exploit since
virtblk_probe() fetches the value again.
- It's more complex now that .validate() takes a first shot at blk_size
and then virtblk_probe() deals with it again later on.
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