在 2021/4/29 上午5:06, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 写道:
On Wed, Apr 21, 2021 at 11:21:10AM +0800, Jason Wang wrote:
Hi All:
Sometimes, the driver doesn't trust the device. This is usually
happens for the encrtpyed VM or VDUSE[1]. In both cases, technology
like swiotlb is used to prevent the poking/mangling of memory from the
device. But this is not sufficient since current virtio driver may
trust what is stored in the descriptor table (coherent mapping) for
performing the DMA operations like unmap and bounce so the device may
choose to utilize the behaviour of swiotlb to perform attacks[2].
We fixed it in the SWIOTLB. That is it saves the expected length
of the DMA operation. See
commit daf9514fd5eb098d7d6f3a1247cb8cc48fc94155
Author: Martin Radev <martin.b.radev@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue Jan 12 16:07:29 2021 +0100
swiotlb: Validate bounce size in the sync/unmap path
The size of the buffer being bounced is not checked if it happens
to be larger than the size of the mapped buffer. Because the size
can be controlled by a device, as it's the case with virtio devices,
this can lead to memory corruption.
Good to know this, but this series tries to protect at different level.
And I believe such protection needs to be done at both levels.
For double insurance, to protect from a malicous device, when DMA API
is used for the device, this series store and use the descriptor
metadata in an auxiliay structure which can not be accessed via
swiotlb instead of the ones in the descriptor table. Actually, we've
Sorry for being dense here, but how wold SWIOTLB be utilized for
this attack?
So we still behaviors that is triggered by device that is not trusted.
Such behavior is what the series tries to avoid. We've learnt a lot of
lessons to eliminate the potential attacks via this. And it would be too
late to fix if we found another issue of SWIOTLB.
Proving "the unexpected device triggered behavior is safe" is very hard
(or even impossible) than "eliminating the unexpected device triggered
behavior totally".
E.g I wonder whether something like this can happen: Consider the DMA
direction of unmap is under the control of device. The device can cheat
the SWIOTLB by changing the flag to modify the device read only buffer.
If yes, it is really safe?
The above patch only log the bounce size but it doesn't log the flag.
Even if it logs the flag, SWIOTLB still doesn't know how each buffer is
used and when it's the appropriate(safe) time to unmap the buffer, only
the driver that is using the SWIOTLB know them.
So I think we need to consolidate on both layers instead of solely
depending on the SWIOTLB.
Thanks
almost achieved that through packed virtqueue and we just need to fix
a corner case of handling mapping errors. For split virtqueue we just
follow what's done in the packed.
Note that we don't duplicate descriptor medata for indirect
descriptors since it uses stream mapping which is read only so it's
safe if the metadata of non-indirect descriptors are correct.
The behaivor for non DMA API is kept for minimizing the performance
impact.
Slightly tested with packed on/off, iommu on/of, swiotlb force/off in
the guest.
Please review.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/fab615ce-5e13-a3b3-3715-a4203b4ab010@xxxxxxxxxx/T/
[2] https://yhbt.net/lore/all/c3629a27-3590-1d9f-211b-c0b7be152b32@xxxxxxxxxx/T/#mc6b6e2343cbeffca68ca7a97e0f473aaa871c95b
Jason Wang (7):
virtio-ring: maintain next in extra state for packed virtqueue
virtio_ring: rename vring_desc_extra_packed
virtio-ring: factor out desc_extra allocation
virtio_ring: secure handling of mapping errors
virtio_ring: introduce virtqueue_desc_add_split()
virtio: use err label in __vring_new_virtqueue()
virtio-ring: store DMA metadata in desc_extra for split virtqueue
drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c | 189 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 141 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
--
2.25.1
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