On 3/12/21 6:38 AM, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@xxxxxxx>
>
> A malicious hypervisor could disable the CPUID intercept for an SEV or
> SEV-ES guest and trick it into the no-SEV boot path, where it could
> potentially reveal secrets. This is not an issue for SEV-SNP guests,
> as the CPUID intercept can't be disabled for those.
>
> Remove the Hypervisor CPUID bit check from the SEV detection code to
> protect against this kind of attack and add a Hypervisor bit equals
> zero check to the SME detection path to prevent non-SEV guests from
> trying to enable SME.
>
> This handles the following cases:
>
> 1) SEV(-ES) guest where CPUID intercept is disabled. The guest
> will still see leaf 0x8000001f and the SEV bit. It can
> retrieve the C-bit and boot normally.
>
> 2) Non-SEV guests with intercepted CPUID will check SEV_STATUS
> MSR and find it 0 and will try to enable SME. This will
> fail when the guest finds MSR_K8_SYSCFG to be zero, as it
> is emulated by KVM. But we can't rely on that, as there
> might be other hypervisors which return this MSR with bit
> 23 set. The Hypervisor bit check will prevent that the
> guest tries to enable SME in this case.
>
> 3) Non-SEV guests on SEV capable hosts with CPUID intercept
> disabled (by a malicious hypervisor) will try to boot into
> the SME path. This will fail, but it is also not considered
> a problem because non-encrypted guests have no protection
> against the hypervisor anyway.
>
> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@xxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
> ---
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S | 6 -----
> arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c | 6 +----
> arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 35 ++++++++++++++------------
> 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
> index aa561795efd1..a6dea4e8a082 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
> @@ -23,12 +23,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(get_sev_encryption_bit)
> push %ecx
> push %edx
>
> - /* Check if running under a hypervisor */
> - movl $1, %eax
> - cpuid
> - bt $31, %ecx /* Check the hypervisor bit */
> - jnc .Lno_sev
> -
> movl $0x80000000, %eax /* CPUID to check the highest leaf */
> cpuid
> cmpl $0x8000001f, %eax /* See if 0x8000001f is available */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
> index cdc04d091242..387b71669818 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
> @@ -186,7 +186,6 @@ void __init do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
> * make it accessible to the hypervisor.
> *
> * In particular, check for:
> - * - Hypervisor CPUID bit
> * - Availability of CPUID leaf 0x8000001f
> * - SEV CPUID bit.
> *
> @@ -194,10 +193,7 @@ void __init do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
> * can't be checked here.
> */
>
> - if ((fn == 1 && !(regs->cx & BIT(31))))
> - /* Hypervisor bit */
> - goto fail;
> - else if (fn == 0x80000000 && (regs->ax < 0x8000001f))
> + if (fn == 0x80000000 && (regs->ax < 0x8000001f))
> /* SEV leaf check */
> goto fail;
> else if ((fn == 0x8000001f && !(regs->ax & BIT(1))))
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
> index 6c5eb6f3f14f..a19374d26101 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
> @@ -503,14 +503,10 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>
> #define AMD_SME_BIT BIT(0)
> #define AMD_SEV_BIT BIT(1)
> - /*
> - * Set the feature mask (SME or SEV) based on whether we are
> - * running under a hypervisor.
> - */
> - eax = 1;
> - ecx = 0;
> - native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
> - feature_mask = (ecx & BIT(31)) ? AMD_SEV_BIT : AMD_SME_BIT;
> +
> + /* Check the SEV MSR whether SEV or SME is enabled */
> + sev_status = __rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV);
> + feature_mask = (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED) ? AMD_SEV_BIT : AMD_SME_BIT;
>
> /*
> * Check for the SME/SEV feature:
> @@ -530,19 +526,26 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>
> /* Check if memory encryption is enabled */
> if (feature_mask == AMD_SME_BIT) {
> + /*
> + * No SME if Hypervisor bit is set. This check is here to
> + * prevent a guest from trying to enable SME. For running as a
> + * KVM guest the MSR_K8_SYSCFG will be sufficient, but there
> + * might be other hypervisors which emulate that MSR as non-zero
> + * or even pass it through to the guest.
> + * A malicious hypervisor can still trick a guest into this
> + * path, but there is no way to protect against that.
> + */
> + eax = 1;
> + ecx = 0;
> + native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
> + if (ecx & BIT(31))
> + return;
> +
> /* For SME, check the SYSCFG MSR */
> msr = __rdmsr(MSR_K8_SYSCFG);
> if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
> return;
> } else {
> - /* For SEV, check the SEV MSR */
> - msr = __rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV);
> - if (!(msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED))
> - return;
> -
> - /* Save SEV_STATUS to avoid reading MSR again */
> - sev_status = msr;
> -
> /* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */
> sme_me_mask = me_mask;
> sev_enabled = true;
>
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