On Wed, Feb 03, 2021 at 02:36:38PM -0500, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote: > > So what? If you guys want to provide a new capability you'll have to do > > work. And designing a new protocol based around the fact that the > > hardware/hypervisor is not trusted and a copy is always required makes > > a lot of more sense than throwing in band aids all over the place. > > If you don't trust the hypervisor, what would this capability be in? Well, they don't trust the hypervisor to not attack the guest somehow, except through the data read. I never really understood the concept, as it leaves too many holes. But the point is that these schemes want to force bounce buffering because they think it is more secure. And if that is what you want you better have protocol build around the fact that each I/O needs to use bounce buffers, so you make those buffers the actual shared memory use for communication, and build the protocol around it. E.g. you don't force the ridiculous NVMe PRP offset rules on the block layer, just to make a complicated swiotlb allocation that needs to preserve the alignment just do I/O. But instead you have a trivial ring buffer or whatever because you know I/O will be copied anyway and none of all the hard work higher layers do to make the I/O suitable for a normal device apply. _______________________________________________ Virtualization mailing list Virtualization@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/virtualization
