Hi Andy, On Thu, Mar 19, 2020 at 08:35:59AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Thu, Mar 19, 2020 at 2:14 AM Joerg Roedel <joro@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@xxxxxxx> > > > > Keep NMI state in SEV-ES code so the kernel can re-enable NMIs for the > > vCPU when it reaches IRET. > > IIRC I suggested just re-enabling NMI in C from do_nmi(). What was > wrong with that approach? If I understand the code correctly a nested NMI will just reset the interrupted NMI handler to start executing again at 'restart_nmi'. The interrupted NMI handler could be in the #VC handler, and it is not safe to just jump back to the start of the NMI handler from somewhere within the #VC handler. So I decided to not allow NMI nesting for SEV-ES and only re-enable the NMI window when the first NMI returns. This is not implemented in this patch, but I will do that once Thomas' entry-code rewrite is upstream. > This causes us to pop the NMI frame off the stack. Assuming the NMI > restart logic is invoked (which is maybe impossible?), we get #DB, > which presumably is actually delivered. And we end up on the #DB > stack, which might already have been in use, so we have a potential > increase in nesting. Also, #DB may be called from an unexpected > context. An SEV-ES hypervisor is required to intercept #DB, which means that the #DB exception actually ends up being a #VC exception. So it will not end up on the #DB stack. > Now somehow #DB is supposed to invoke #VC, which is supposed to do the > magic hypercall, and all of this is supposed to be safe? Or is #DB > unconditionally redirected to #VC? What happens if we had no stack > (e.g. we interrupted SYSCALL) or we were already in #VC to begin with? Yeah, as I said above, the #DB is redirected to #VC, as the hypervisor has to intercept #DB. The stack-problem is the one that prevents the Single-step-over-iret approach right now, because the NMI can hit while in kernel mode and on entry stack, which the generic entry code (besided NMI) does not handle. Getting a #VC exception there (like after an IRET to that state) breaks things. Last, in this version of the patch-set the #VC handler became nesting-safe. It detects whether the per-cpu GHCB is in use and safes/restores its contents in this case. > I think there are two credible ways to approach this: > > 1. Just put the NMI unmask in do_nmi(). The kernel *already* knows > how to handle running do_nmi() with NMIs unmasked. This is much, much > simpler than your code. Right, and I thought about that, but the implication is that the complexity is moved somewhere else, namely into the #VC handler, which then has to be restartable. > 2. Have an entirely separate NMI path for the > SEV-ES-on-misdesigned-CPU case. And have very clear documentation for > what prevents this code from being executed on future CPUs (Zen3?) > that have this issue fixed for real? That sounds like a good alternative, I will investigate this approach. The NMI handler should be much simpler as it doesn't need to allow NMI nesting. The question is, does the C code down the NMI path depend on the NMI handlers stack frame layout (e.g. the in-nmi flag)? Regards, Joerg _______________________________________________ Virtualization mailing list Virtualization@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/virtualization
