On Thu, Aug 02, 2018 at 11:01:26AM -0500, Benjamin Herrenschmidt wrote: > On Thu, 2018-08-02 at 18:41 +0300, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > > > > > I don't completely agree: > > > > > > 1 - VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM is a property of the "other side", ie qemu > > > for example. It indicates that the peer bypasses the normal platform > > > iommu. The platform code in the guest has no real way to know that this > > > is the case, this is a specific "feature" of the qemu implementation. > > > > > > 2 - VIRTIO_F_PLATFORM_DMA (or whatever you want to call it), is a > > > property of the guest platform itself (not qemu), there's no way the > > > "peer" can advertize it via the virtio negociated flags. At least for > > > us. I don't know for sure whether that would be workable for the ARM > > > case. In our case, qemu has no idea at VM creation time that the VM > > > will turn itself into a secure VM and thus will require bounce > > > buffering for IOs (including virtio). > > > > > > So unless we have another hook for the arch code to set > > > VIRTIO_F_PLATFORM_DMA on selected (or all) virtio devices from the > > > guest itself, I don't see that as a way to deal with it. > > > > > > > The other issue is VIRTIO_F_IO_BARRIER > > > > which is very vaguely defined, and which needs a better definition. > > > > And last but not least we'll need some text explaining the challenges > > > > of hardware devices - I think VIRTIO_F_PLATFORM_DMA + VIRTIO_F_IO_BARRIER > > > > is what would basically cover them, but a good description including > > > > an explanation of why these matter. > > > > > > Ben. > > > > > > > So is it true that from qemu point of view there is nothing special > > going on? You pass in a PA, host writes there. > > Yes, qemu doesn't see a different. It's the guest that will bounce the > pages via a pool of "insecure" pages that qemu can access. Normal pages > in a secure VM come from PAs that qemu cannot physically access. > > Cheers, > Ben. > I see. So yes, given that device does not know or care, using virtio features is an awkward fit. So let's say as a quick fix for you maybe we could generalize the xen_domain hack, instead of just checking xen_domain check some static branch. Then teach xen and others to enable that. OK but problem then becomes this: if you do this and virtio device appears behind a vIOMMU and it does not advertize the IOMMU flag, the code will try to use the vIOMMU mappings and fail. It does look like even with trick above, you need a special version of DMA ops that does just swiotlb but not any of the other things DMA API might do. Thoughts? -- MST _______________________________________________ Virtualization mailing list Virtualization@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/virtualization
