On Mon, Jun 04, 2018 at 07:48:54PM +1000, Benjamin Herrenschmidt wrote: > On Mon, 2018-06-04 at 18:57 +1000, David Gibson wrote: > > > > > - First qemu doesn't know that the guest will switch to "secure mode" > > > in advance. There is no difference between a normal and a secure > > > partition until the partition does the magic UV call to "enter secure > > > mode" and qemu doesn't see any of it. So who can set the flag here ? > > > > This seems weird to me. As a rule HV calls should go through qemu - > > or be allowed to go directly to KVM *by* qemu. > > It's not an HV call, it's a UV call, qemu won't see it, qemu isn't > trusted. Now the UV *will* reflect that to the HV via some synthetized > HV calls, and we *could* have those do a pass by qemu, however, so far, > our entire design doesn't rely on *any* qemu knowledge whatsoever and > it would be sad to add it just for that purpose. > > Additionally, this is rather orthogonal, see my other email, the > problem we are trying to solve is *not* a qemu problem and it doesn't > make sense to leak that into qemu. > > > We generally reserve > > the latter for hot path things. Since this isn't a hot path, having > > the call handled directly by the kernel seems wrong. > > > > Unless a "UV call" is something different I don't know about. > > Yes, a UV call goes to the Ultravisor, not the Hypervisor. The > Hypervisor isn't trusted. Ah, right. Is that implemented in the host kernel, or in something further above? -- David Gibson | I'll have my music baroque, and my code david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au | minimalist, thank you. NOT _the_ _other_ | _way_ _around_! http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson
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