On Wed, Jan 28, 2015 at 11:34:02AM +0100, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On Mi, 2015-01-28 at 11:46 +0200, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 28, 2015 at 09:25:08AM +0100, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
> > > Hello,
> > >
> > > On Di, 2015-01-27 at 18:08 +0200, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > > On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 05:02:31PM +0100, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
> > > > > On Di, 2015-01-27 at 09:26 -0500, Vlad Yasevich wrote:
> > > > > > On 01/27/2015 08:47 AM, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
> > > > > > > On Di, 2015-01-27 at 10:42 +0200, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > > > > >> On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 02:47:54AM +0000, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> > > > > > >>> On Mon, 2015-01-26 at 09:37 -0500, Vladislav Yasevich wrote:
> > > > > > >>>> If the IPv6 fragment id has not been set and we perform
> > > > > > >>>> fragmentation due to UFO, select a new fragment id.
> > > > > > >>>> When we store the fragment id into skb_shinfo, set the bit
> > > > > > >>>> in the skb so we can re-use the selected id.
> > > > > > >>>> This preserves the behavior of UFO packets generated on the
> > > > > > >>>> host and solves the issue of id generation for packet sockets
> > > > > > >>>> and tap/macvtap devices.
> > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > >>>> This patch moves ipv6_select_ident() back in to the header file.
> > > > > > >>>> It also provides the helper function that sets skb_shinfo() frag
> > > > > > >>>> id and sets the bit.
> > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > >>>> It also makes sure that we select the fragment id when doing
> > > > > > >>>> just gso validation, since it's possible for the packet to
> > > > > > >>>> come from an untrusted source (VM) and be forwarded through
> > > > > > >>>> a UFO enabled device which will expect the fragment id.
> > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > >>>> CC: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > > > >>>> Signed-off-by: Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevic@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > > > >>>> ---
> > > > > > >>>> include/linux/skbuff.h | 3 ++-
> > > > > > >>>> include/net/ipv6.h | 2 ++
> > > > > > >>>> net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 4 ++--
> > > > > > >>>> net/ipv6/output_core.c | 9 ++++++++-
> > > > > > >>>> net/ipv6/udp_offload.c | 10 +++++++++-
> > > > > > >>>> 5 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > >>>> diff --git a/include/linux/skbuff.h b/include/linux/skbuff.h
> > > > > > >>>> index 85ab7d7..3ad5203 100644
> > > > > > >>>> --- a/include/linux/skbuff.h
> > > > > > >>>> +++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h
> > > > > > >>>> @@ -605,7 +605,8 @@ struct sk_buff {
> > > > > > >>>> __u8 ipvs_property:1;
> > > > > > >>>> __u8 inner_protocol_type:1;
> > > > > > >>>> __u8 remcsum_offload:1;
> > > > > > >>>> - /* 3 or 5 bit hole */
> > > > > > >>>> + __u8 ufo_fragid_set:1;
> > > > > > >>> [...]
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>> Doesn't the flag belong in struct skb_shared_info, rather than struct
> > > > > > >>> sk_buff? Otherwise this looks fine.
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>> Ben.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Hmm we seem to be out of tx flags.
> > > > > > >> Maybe ip6_frag_id == 0 should mean "not set".
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Maybe that is the best idea. Definitely the ufo_fragid_set bit should
> > > > > > > move into the skb_shared_info area.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > That's what I originally wanted to do, but had to move and grow txflags thus
> > > > > > skb_shinfo ended up growing. I wanted to avoid that, so stole an skb flag.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I considered treating fragid == 0 as unset, but a 0 fragid is perfectly valid
> > > > > > from the protocol perspective and could actually be generated by the id generator
> > > > > > functions. This may cause us to call the id generation multiple times.
> > > > >
> > > > > Are there plans in the long run to let virtio_net transmit auxiliary
> > > > > data to the other end so we can clean all of this this up one day?
> > > > >
> > > > > I don't like the whole situation: looking into the virtio_net headers
> > > > > just adding a field for ipv6 fragmentation ids to those small structs
> > > > > seems bloated, not doing it feels incorrect. :/
> > > > >
> > > > > Thoughts?
> > > > >
> > > > > Bye,
> > > > > Hannes
> > > >
> > > > I'm not sure - what will be achieved by generating the IDs guest side as
> > > > opposed to host side? It's certainly harder to get hold of entropy
> > > > guest-side.
> > >
> > > It is not only about entropy but about uniqueness. Also fragmentation
> > > ids should not be discoverable,
> >
> > I belive "predictable" is the language used by the IETF draft.
> >
> > > so there are several aspects:
> > >
> > > I see fragmentation id generation still as security critical:
> > > When Eric patched the frag id generator in 04ca6973f7c1a0d ("ip: make IP
> > > identifiers less predictable") I could patch my kernels and use the
> > > patch regardless of the machine being virtualized or not. It was not
> > > dependent on the hypervisor.
> >
> > And now it's even easier - just patch the hypervisor, and all VMs
> > automatically benefit.
>
> Sometimes the hypervisor is not under my control. You would need to
> patch both kernels in your case - non gso frames would still get the
> fragmentation id generated in the host kernel.
Confused. You would have to patch both kernels *in your case*.
If it's all done by host, then it's in a single place, on host.
> > > I think that is the same reasoning why we
> > > don't support TOE.
> > > If we use one generator in the hypervisor in an openstack alike setting,
> > > the host deals with quite a lot of overlay networks. A lot of default
> > > configurations use the same addresses internally, so on the hypervisor
> > > the frag id generators would interfere by design.
> > > I could come up with an attack scenario for DNS servers (again :) ):
> > >
> > > You are sitting next to a DNS server on the same hypervisor and can send
> > > packets without source validation (because that is handled later on in
> > > case of openvswitch when the packet is put into the corresponding
> > > overlay network). You emit a gso packet with the same source and
> > > destination addresses as the DNS server would do and would get an
> > > fragmentation id which is linearly (+ time delta) incremented depending
> > > on the source and destination address. With such a leak you could start
> > > trying attack and spoof DNS responses (fragmentation attacks etc.).
> > > See also details on such kind of attacks in the description of commit
> > > 04ca6973f7c1a0d.
> > >
> > > AFAIK IETF tried with IPv6 to push fragmentation id generation to the
> > > end hosts, that's also the reason for the introduction of atomic
> > > fragments (which are now being rolled back ;) ).
> > >
> > > Still it is better to generate a frag id on the hypervisor than just
> > > sending a 0, so I am ok with this change, albeit not happy.
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > > Hannes
> > >
> >
> > OK so to summarize, identifiers are only re-randomized once per jiffy,
> > so you worry that within this window, an external observer can discover
> > past fragment ID values and so predict the future ones.
> > All that's required is that two paths go through the same box performing
> > fragmentation.
> >
> > Is that a fair summary?
> >
> > If yes, we can make this a bit harder by mixing in some
> > data per input and/or output devices.
> >
> > For example, just to give you the idea:
> >
> > diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
> > index 683d493..4faa7ef 100644
> > --- a/net/core/dev.c
> > +++ b/net/core/dev.c
> > @@ -3625,6 +3625,7 @@ static int __netif_receive_skb_core(struct sk_buff *skb, bool pfmemalloc)
> > trace_netif_receive_skb(skb);
> >
> > orig_dev = skb->dev;
> > + skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id = skb->dev->ifindex;
> >
> > skb_reset_network_header(skb);
> > if (!skb_transport_header_was_set(skb))
> > diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
> > index ce69a12..819a821 100644
> > --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
> > +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
> > @@ -1092,7 +1092,8 @@ static inline int ip6_ufo_append_data(struct sock *sk,
> > sizeof(struct frag_hdr)) & ~7;
> > skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
> > ipv6_select_ident(&fhdr, rt);
> > - skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id = fhdr.identification;
> > + skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id = jhash_1word(skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id,
> > + fhdr.identification);
> >
> > append:
> > return skb_append_datato_frags(sk, skb, getfrag, from,
> >
>
> I thought about mixing in the incoming interface identifier into the
> frag id generation, but that could hurt us badly as soon as a VM has
> more than one interface to the outside world and uses e.g. ECMP.
I don't understand. Fragmentation is done after routing,
isn't it? So all fragments always go out on the same device.
> We need
> to make sure that those frag ids are unique and the kernel needs to be
> better than just using a random number generator.
>
> Bye,
> Hannes
32 bit numbers can't be unique. They just shouldn't be discoverable
by an off-path observer.
--
MST
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