The khwrngd thread is started when a hwrng device of sufficient quality is registered. The virtio-rng device is backed by the hypervisor, and we trust the hypervisor to provide real entropy. A malicious or badly-implemented hypervisor is a scenario that's irrelevant -- such a setup is bound to cause all sorts of badness, and a compromised hwrng is the least of the user's worries. Given this, we might as well assume that the quality of randomness we receive is perfectly trustworthy. Hence, we use 100% for the factor, indicating maximum confidence in the source. Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Amos Kong <akong@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- Pretty small and contained patch; would be great if it is picked up for 3.17. v2: re-word commit msg (hpa) v3: re-word commit msg (tytso) --- drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c index 0027137..2e3139e 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c @@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ static int probe_common(struct virtio_device *vdev) .cleanup = virtio_cleanup, .priv = (unsigned long)vi, .name = vi->name, + .quality = 1000, }; vdev->priv = vi; -- 1.9.3 _______________________________________________ Virtualization mailing list Virtualization@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/virtualization
