[Public] > > > > Actually I intentionally left that in the RFC patch, to only do this based > off > > > > of tb_acpi_may_tunnel_pcie, so I think that should still work as you > > > described > > > > if boot firmware turned off PCIe tunneling. > > > > > > Right but if the user still wants to disable it, like say you are > > > travelling and you want to be sure that no PCIe devices get attached > > > while your laptop is charging from a public "charging station" (whatever > > > is the right term). > > > > So wouldn't you flip the default in BIOS setup to disable PCIe tunnels then > for > > this use case? > > What if you are on Chromebook? Or something where this is not user > configurable? > > > Otherwise with how it is today you end up with the PCIe tunnel created in > the > > boot FW and then coming into the OS if it's the same path the tunnel stays > > in place with no opportunity for userspace to authorize it, no? > > The boot FW does not need to support CM capabilites nor does it need to > provide the ACPI _OSC. Ah right - my thoughts were entirely UEFI firmware centric. Chromebooks don't have BIOS setup, nor do they all have the USB4 _OSC. Then yes I agree we do need to "keep" this authorization decision in userspace.
