On Thu, Aug 08, 2019 at 02:46:54PM +0200, Greg KH wrote: > On Thu, Aug 08, 2019 at 05:38:06AM -0700, syzbot wrote: > > Hello, > > > > syzbot found the following crash on: > > > > HEAD commit: e96407b4 usb-fuzzer: main usb gadget fuzzer driver > > git tree: https://github.com/google/kasan.git usb-fuzzer > > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=13aeaece600000 > > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=cfa2c18fb6a8068e > > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=45b2f40f0778cfa7634e > > compiler: gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental) > > > > Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this crash yet. > > > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit: > > Reported-by: syzbot+45b2f40f0778cfa7634e@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > > > ldusb 6-1:0.124: Read buffer overflow, -131383996186150 bytes dropped > > That's a funny number :) > > Nice overflow found, I see you are now starting to fuzz the char device > nodes of usb drivers... > > Michael, care to fix this up? This looks like the length in the read-from-device buffer is unchecked: /* actual_buffer contains actual_length + interrupt_in_buffer */ actual_buffer = (size_t *)(dev->ring_buffer + dev->ring_tail * (sizeof(size_t)+dev->interrupt_in_endpoint_size)); bytes_to_read = min(count, *actual_buffer); if (bytes_to_read < *actual_buffer) dev_warn(&dev->intf->dev, "Read buffer overflow, %zd bytes dropped\n", *actual_buffer-bytes_to_read); /* copy one interrupt_in_buffer from ring_buffer into userspace */ if (copy_to_user(buffer, actual_buffer+1, bytes_to_read)) { retval = -EFAULT; goto unlock_exit; } I assume what's stored at actual_buffer is bogus and needs validation somewhere before it's actually used. (If not here, maybe where ever the write into the buffer originally happens?) -- Kees Cook
