Hi Greg, "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes: > num can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to > a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. > > This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: > > drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c:3177 fsg_lun_make() warn: > potential spectre issue 'fsg_opts->common->luns' [r] (local cap) > > Fix this by sanitizing num before using it to index > fsg_opts->common->luns > > Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is > to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be > completed with a dependent load/store [1]. > > [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 > > Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Can you still take this as an urgent fix? Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@xxxxxxxxx> -- balbi
