On 03/06/2018 09:58 PM, Shuah Khan wrote:
On 03/06/2018 01:35 AM, Salvador Fandiño wrote:
On 03/06/2018 01:03 AM, Shuah Khan wrote:
On 03/05/2018 02:00 AM, Salvador Fandiño wrote:
On 02/21/2018 01:35 AM, Shuah Khan wrote:
Hi Salvador,
On 01/30/2018 01:36 AM, Salvador Fandino wrote:
Let me start by explaining the problem that have motivated me to write
this patches:
I work on the QVD, a virtual desktop platform for Linux. This software
runs Linux desktops (i.e. XFCE, KDE) and their applications inside LXC
containers, and makes then available through the network to remote
users.
Supporting USB devices is a common feature customers have been
requesting us for a long time (in order to use, for instance, remote
signature pads, bar-code scanners, fingerprint readers, etc.). So, we
have been working on that feature using the USB/IP layer on the
kernel.
Connecting and disconnecting devices and transferring data works
seamless for the devices listed above. But we also want to make the
usbip operations private to the container where they are run. For
instance, it is unacceptable for our product, that one user could list
the devices connected by other users or access them.
We can control how can access every device using cgroups once those
are attached, but the usbip layer is not providing any mechanism for
controlling who can attach, detach or list the devices.
In this use-case:
- does a container act as usbip client and attach devices from their
host?
- do containers attach remote devices from other systems?
In my particular case devices are imported from remote machines. But well, the thing is that I don't care where the connections come from, they could even be devices emulated in user space.
Is the core of the problem really that any remote system can import without
a provision for being able to restrict export to a set of remote machines?
If so, this is a generic problem even without containers and I would like
to solve this with a generic solution that works in all cases, not just for
containers.
No, that is a different issue. You are talking about controlling which devices can be connected, from which hosts, etc. That is an interesting problem but not the one I am trying to tackle here.
Not entirely. These problems are linked if you use usbip driver and usbip
tools. USBIp driver is intended to be used in conjunction with the usbip
tools.
I will come back to that later.
I don't mind which every user does inside its container as far as it does not interfere which other users. In practice that means:
1- Not being able to attach/detach devices in other container
How do container attach/detach in other containers in your setup?
(let's for a moment forget I am using my own user-space USBIP layer,
because it doesn't do anything different than the USBIP tools other than
not using TCP sockets as the transport layer)
The sysfs is bind-mounted inside the container. I have also enabled
access to USBIP devices through the cgroups device hierarchy.
In that scenario, I can just use the "usbip" tool to attach remote USBIP
devices.
Limiting what devices can be attached or detached inside the "usbip"
tool is not enough because, in general, the container's root can install
any software he likes inside the container including for instance, a
mangled "usbip" tool with any don't-touch-others-usbip-devices policy we
could implement there disabled.
2- Not being able to list devices attached in other containers
How do container list devices in other containers in your setup?
Which the current implementation, running "usbip port" inside the
container shows all the devices attached from the host or from any
container.
The information is available from the "status*" entries in vhci_hcd.0,
so, again, even if some
see-only-the-usbip-devices-attached-from-this-container policy where
enforced by the usbip tool, the container's root would still be able to
read the status files directly and see all the devices connected host-wise.
In the end, that means that any enforcement of container-to-container or
container-to-host USBIP access restriction must be made at the kernel
level and that's just what my proposed patch allows to do: It makes the
vhci_hcd devices fully independent. Every one having its own attach,
detach and status objects. In that way, every container can be limited
to accessing just one of them (well, or some subset) by selectively
hidden vhci_hcd.* entries on the container sysfs when it is started.
Then, from inside the container it is impossible to attach/detach
devices in other containers vhci_hcd or to list them.
Coming back to where you said "Not entirely. These problems are linked
if you use usbip driver and usbip tools. USBIp driver is intended to be
used in conjunction with the usbip tools."
Well, as I have already explained, the usbip user space tools can not be
used to limit access from the container to the host or to other
containers because the container's root may mangle it in order to
override any protection. So, I don't see how using or not using the
usbip has any importance here.
3- Not being able to access devices attached in other containers.
Point 3 is already enforceable using the devices hierarchy in cgroups. For points 1 and 2, my proposition is making every vhci_hcd device have its own fully independent sysfs directory (instead of all of them going through vhci_hcd.0) so that they can be selectively exposed with rw permissions inside the containers.
The approach in this patch series appears to solve the problem just for
containers.
Did you explore a solution to add a mechanism for access control to
usbip?
Could you elaborate on that?
For "usbip", do you mean the user space tools?
If that is the case, I don't think it would be enough.
My aim is to limit vhci usage from containers and I have no control about what runs inside the containers. So, a mangled usbip tool-set could > > be used by a malicious user to circumvent any access control set there.>
I mean the driver. There might be changes necessary in the user-space
as well depending on how the access controls are implemented. I am not
proposing implementing access controls in the user-space.
IMO, there is no other choice but to control access to VHCI at the kernel level.
Probably. Please give as many details as possible on your environment
for me to make a call on if this problem can be solved in a different
way.
In our particular real life application, we are targeting the kernel interface directly, we don't use the usbip tools at all. It is that way because we have our own* transport layer, authentication and authorization mechanisms. And once all the handshaking is done we end with a socket we can directly pass to the kernel in order to get it attached to a vhci_hcd port.
How do you do that? Can you elaborate on how do you pass the socket to the USBIP
host?
My userspace application creates a socketpair and passes one side to the
kernel writing to the "attach" file. It does exactly the same the usbip
tool does, the only difference is that instead of a TCP socket it uses a
UNIX one.
The way you are using is unsupported and just not the way it is designed
to be used.
Yea, that's the magic of Open Source. You intended your application to
be used some way, somebody comes with a slightly different use case and
submits a patch so that his use case is also supported...
In any case, the discussion here should not be affected by if I am using
the standard user space tools or some custom ones. It is only related to
how to effectively allow compartmentalization of the USBIP devices in a
secure manner.
We don't like having an extra application listening on some TCP port which can be accessed by third parties on the client side either.
USBIP is a server/client protocol is intended to work that way. You can specify
a port to use.
The imported USB devices used are mostly devices which do not require kernel modules and that are accessed though libusb by the applications (i.e., id card readers, barcode scanners, signing pads, etc.).
This is just not they was USBIP driver in the kernel is intended to be used.
I am beginning to think that USBIP isn't the right solution for your application.
You are talking about not using the protocol the way it is designed and finding
custom ways to use it.
I am all for making the USBIP more secure for container environment by adding
features to restrict:
- Remote machines that can import (attach) - this can be per device.
- Make sure detach is done only by the remote that imported the device
- Restrict listing of imported devices to the remote that imported them
- Enhance current version match to a stricter version match and add checksum
match between kernel and user-space.
Let me know if you would like to explore the above options that are generic as
opposed to custom solution based on a setup that doesn't use the USBIP driver
the way it is designed to work.
thanks,
-- Shuah
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-usb" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
