Extended attribute copy-up functionality added via 19472b69d639d
("selinux: Implementation for inode_copy_up_xattr() hook") sees
"security.selinux" contexts dropped, instead relying on contexts
applied via the inode_copy_up() hook.
When copy-up takes place during early boot, prior to selinux
initialization / policy load, the context stripping can be unwanted
and unexpected. Make filtering dependent on selinux_initialized().
RFC: This changes user behaviour so is likely unacceptable. Still,
I'd be interested in hearing other suggestions for how this could be
addressed.
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 2aa0e219d7217..fb3e53bb7e90c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3527,7 +3527,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
* don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
* xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
*/
- if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
+ if (selinux_initialized() && strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
return 1; /* Discard */
/*
* Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
--
2.35.3
