On Wed, 2023-07-05 at 15:05 +0200, Christian Brauner wrote: > On Wed, Jul 05, 2023 at 05:00:45AM -0700, syzbot wrote: > > Hello, > > > > syzbot found the following issue on: > > > > HEAD commit: d528014517f2 Revert ".gitignore: ignore *.cover and *.mbx" > > git tree: upstream > > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=14fad002a80000 > > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=1085b4238c9eb6ba > > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a67fc5321ffb4b311c98 > > compiler: Debian clang version 15.0.7, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2 > > > > Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this issue yet. > > > > Downloadable assets: > > disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/fef94e788067/disk-d5280145.raw.xz > > vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/576412ea518b/vmlinux-d5280145.xz > > kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/685a0e4be06b/bzImage-d5280145.xz > > > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: > > Reported-by: syzbot+a67fc5321ffb4b311c98@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > > > general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000a: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN > > KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000050-0x0000000000000057] > > CPU: 1 PID: 10127 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.4.0-syzkaller-11478-gd528014517f2 #0 > > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023 > > RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x10d/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5012 > > Code: 85 75 18 00 00 83 3d 15 c8 2c 0d 00 48 89 9c 24 10 01 00 00 0f 84 f8 0f 00 00 83 3d 5c de b3 0b 00 74 34 48 89 d0 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 00 00 74 1a 48 89 d7 e8 b4 51 79 00 48 8b 94 24 80 00 00 > > RSP: 0018:ffffc900169be9e0 EFLAGS: 00010006 > > RAX: 000000000000000a RBX: 1ffff92002d37d60 RCX: 0000000000000002 > > RDX: 0000000000000050 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000050 > > RBP: ffffc900169beca8 R08: dffffc0000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 > > R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1d2fe76 R12: 0000000000000000 > > R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff88802091d940 > > FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > > CR2: 00007fa22a3fe000 CR3: 000000004b5e1000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 > > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > > Call Trace: > > <TASK> > > lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 > > seqcount_lockdep_reader_access+0x139/0x220 include/linux/seqlock.h:102 > > get_fs_root_rcu fs/d_path.c:244 [inline] > > d_path+0x2f0/0x6e0 fs/d_path.c:286 > > audit_log_d_path+0xd3/0x310 kernel/audit.c:2139 > > dump_common_audit_data security/lsm_audit.c:224 [inline] > > common_lsm_audit+0x7cf/0x1a90 security/lsm_audit.c:458 > > smack_log+0x421/0x540 security/smack/smack_access.c:383 > > smk_tskacc+0x2ff/0x360 security/smack/smack_access.c:253 > > smack_inode_getattr+0x203/0x270 security/smack/smack_lsm.c:1202 > > security_inode_getattr+0xd3/0x120 security/security.c:2114 > > vfs_getattr+0x25/0x70 fs/stat.c:167 > > ovl_getattr+0x1b1/0xf70 fs/overlayfs/inode.c:174 > > ima_check_last_writer security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:171 [inline] > > ima_file_free+0x26e/0x4b0 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:203 > > Ugh, I think the root of this might all be the call back into > vfs_getattr() that happens on overlayfs: > > __fput() > -> ima_file_free() > -> mutex_lock() > -> vfs_getattr_nosec() > -> i_op->getattr() == ovl_getattr() > -> vfs_getattr() > -> security_inode_getattr() > -> mutex_unlock() > > So either overlayfs needs to call vfs_getattr_nosec() when the request > comes from vfs_getattr_nosec() or this needs to use > backing_file_real_path() to operate on the real underlying path. > > Thoughts? > When you say "this needs to use backing_file_real_path()", what do you mean by "this"? IMA? That said, passing some sort of NOSEC flag to vfs_getattr that designates the call as kernel-internal seems like the more correct thing to do here, and might be useful in other weird stacking cases like this. > > __fput+0x36a/0x950 fs/file_table.c:378 > > task_work_run+0x24a/0x300 kernel/task_work.c:179 > > exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline] > > do_exit+0x68f/0x2290 kernel/exit.c:874 > > do_group_exit+0x206/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1024 > > get_signal+0x1709/0x17e0 kernel/signal.c:2877 > > arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x91/0x670 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:308 > > exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x6a/0x100 kernel/entry/common.c:168 > > exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xb1/0x140 kernel/entry/common.c:204 > > __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:286 [inline] > > syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x64/0x280 kernel/entry/common.c:297 > > do_syscall_64+0x4d/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd > > RIP: 0033:0x7f7f3ca8c389 > > Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f7f3ca8c35f. > > RSP: 002b:00007f7f3d741168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000052 > > RAX: fffffffffffffffb RBX: 00007f7f3cbac050 RCX: 00007f7f3ca8c389 > > RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000020000180 > > RBP: 00007f7f3cad7493 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 > > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 > > R13: 00007fff8432555f R14: 00007f7f3d741300 R15: 0000000000022000 > > </TASK> > > Modules linked in: > > ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- > > RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x10d/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5012 > > Code: 85 75 18 00 00 83 3d 15 c8 2c 0d 00 48 89 9c 24 10 01 00 00 0f 84 f8 0f 00 00 83 3d 5c de b3 0b 00 74 34 48 89 d0 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 00 00 74 1a 48 89 d7 e8 b4 51 79 00 48 8b 94 24 80 00 00 > > RSP: 0018:ffffc900169be9e0 EFLAGS: 00010006 > > RAX: 000000000000000a RBX: 1ffff92002d37d60 RCX: 0000000000000002 > > RDX: 0000000000000050 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000050 > > RBP: ffffc900169beca8 R08: dffffc0000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 > > R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1d2fe76 R12: 0000000000000000 > > R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff88802091d940 > > FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > > CR2: 00007fa22a3fe000 CR3: 000000004b5e1000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 > > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > > ---------------- > > Code disassembly (best guess): > > 0: 85 75 18 test %esi,0x18(%rbp) > > 3: 00 00 add %al,(%rax) > > 5: 83 3d 15 c8 2c 0d 00 cmpl $0x0,0xd2cc815(%rip) # 0xd2cc821 > > c: 48 89 9c 24 10 01 00 mov %rbx,0x110(%rsp) > > 13: 00 > > 14: 0f 84 f8 0f 00 00 je 0x1012 > > 1a: 83 3d 5c de b3 0b 00 cmpl $0x0,0xbb3de5c(%rip) # 0xbb3de7d > > 21: 74 34 je 0x57 > > 23: 48 89 d0 mov %rdx,%rax > > 26: 48 c1 e8 03 shr $0x3,%rax > > * 2a: 42 80 3c 00 00 cmpb $0x0,(%rax,%r8,1) <-- trapping instruction > > 2f: 74 1a je 0x4b > > 31: 48 89 d7 mov %rdx,%rdi > > 34: e8 b4 51 79 00 callq 0x7951ed > > 39: 48 rex.W > > 3a: 8b .byte 0x8b > > 3b: 94 xchg %eax,%esp > > 3c: 24 80 and $0x80,%al > > > > > > --- > > This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors. > > See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot. > > syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. > > > > syzbot will keep track of this issue. See: > > https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot. > > > > If the bug is already fixed, let syzbot know by replying with: > > #syz fix: exact-commit-title > > > > If you want to change bug's subsystems, reply with: > > #syz set subsystems: new-subsystem > > (See the list of subsystem names on the web dashboard) > > > > If the bug is a duplicate of another bug, reply with: > > #syz dup: exact-subject-of-another-report > > > > If you want to undo deduplication, reply with: > > #syz undup -- Jeff Layton <jlayton@xxxxxxxxxx>
