On Thu, Apr 6, 2023 at 10:20 AM Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 4/6/23 10:05, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Thu, Apr 6, 2023 at 6:26 AM Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> On Wed, Apr 05, 2023 at 01:14:49PM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> >>> Overlayfs fails to notify IMA / EVM about file content modifications
> >>> and therefore IMA-appraised files may execute even though their file
> >>> signature does not validate against the changed hash of the file
> >>> anymore. To resolve this issue, add a call to integrity_notify_change()
> >>> to the ovl_release() function to notify the integrity subsystem about
> >>> file changes. The set flag triggers the re-evaluation of the file by
> >>> IMA / EVM once the file is accessed again.
> >>>
> >>> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> >>> ---
> >>> fs/overlayfs/file.c | 4 ++++
> >>> include/linux/integrity.h | 6 ++++++
> >>> security/integrity/iint.c | 13 +++++++++++++
> >>> 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
> >>>
> >>> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/file.c b/fs/overlayfs/file.c
> >>> index 6011f955436b..19b8f4bcc18c 100644
> >>> --- a/fs/overlayfs/file.c
> >>> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/file.c
> >>> @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
> >>> #include <linux/security.h>
> >>> #include <linux/mm.h>
> >>> #include <linux/fs.h>
> >>> +#include <linux/integrity.h>
> >>> #include "overlayfs.h"
> >>>
> >>> struct ovl_aio_req {
> >>> @@ -169,6 +170,9 @@ static int ovl_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> >>>
> >>> static int ovl_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> >>> {
> >>> + if (file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE)
> >>> + integrity_notify_change(inode);
> >>> +
> >>> fput(file->private_data);
> >>>
> >>> return 0;
> >>> diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
> >>> index 2ea0f2f65ab6..cefdeccc1619 100644
> >>> --- a/include/linux/integrity.h
> >>> +++ b/include/linux/integrity.h
> >>> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ enum integrity_status {
> >>> #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY
> >>> extern struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode);
> >>> extern void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
> >>> +extern void integrity_notify_change(struct inode *inode);
> >>
> >> I thought we concluded that ima is going to move into the security hook
> >> infrastructure so it seems this should be a proper LSM hook?
> >
> > We are working towards migrating IMA/EVM to the LSM layer, but there
> > are a few things we need to fix/update/remove first; if anyone is
> > curious, you can join the LSM list as we've been discussing some of
> > these changes this week. Bug fixes like this should probably remain
> > as IMA/EVM calls for the time being, with the understanding that they
> > will migrate over with the rest of IMA/EVM.
> >
> > That said, we should give Mimi a chance to review this patch as it is
> > possible there is a different/better approach. A bit of patience may
> > be required as I know Mimi is very busy at the moment.
>
> There may be a better approach actually by increasing the inode's i_version,
> which then should trigger the appropriate path in ima_check_last_writer().
I'm not the VFS/inode expert here, but I thought the inode's i_version
field was only supposed to be bumped when the inode metadata changed,
not necessarily the file contents, right?
That said, overlayfs is a bit different so maybe that's okay, but I
think we would need to hear from the VFS folks if this is acceptable.
--
paul-moore.com
