Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> 于2022年8月31日周三 23:29写道：
>
> On Wed, Aug 31, 2022 at 03:53:58PM +0200, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> > On Wed, 31 Aug 2022 at 15:43, Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Wed, Aug 31, 2022 at 03:00:18PM +0200, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> > > > On Thu, 25 Aug 2022 at 15:08, Zhang Tianci
> > > > <zhangtianci.1997@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > There is a wrong case of link() on overlay:
> > > > > $ mkdir /lower /fuse /merge
> > > > > $ mount -t fuse /fuse
> > > > > $ mkdir /fuse/upper /fuse/work
> > > > > $ mount -t overlay /merge -o lowerdir=/lower,upperdir=/fuse/upper,\
> > > > > workdir=work
> > > > > $ touch /merge/file
> > > > > $ chown bin.bin /merge/file // the file's caller becomes "bin"
> > > > > $ ln /merge/file /merge/lnkfile
> > > > >
> > > > > Then we will get an error(EACCES) because fuse daemon checks the link()'s
> > > > > caller is "bin", it denied this request.
> > > > >
> > > > > In the changing history of ovl_link(), there are two key commits:
> > > > >
> > > > > The first is commit bb0d2b8ad296 ("ovl: fix sgid on directory") which
> > > > > overrides the cred's fsuid/fsgid using the new inode. The new inode's
> > > > > owner is initialized by inode_init_owner(), and inode->fsuid is
> > > > > assigned to the current user. So the override fsuid becomes the
> > > > > current user. We know link() is actually modifying the directory, so
> > > > > the caller must have the MAY_WRITE permission on the directory. The
> > > > > current caller may should have this permission. This is acceptable
> > > > > to use the caller's fsuid.
> > > > >
> > > > > The second is commit 51f7e52dc943 ("ovl: share inode for hard link")
> > > > > which removed the inode creation in ovl_link(). This commit move
> > > > > inode_init_owner() into ovl_create_object(), so the ovl_link() just
> > > > > give the old inode to ovl_create_or_link(). Then the override fsuid
> > > > > becomes the old inode's fsuid, neither the caller nor the overlay's
> > > > > creator! So this is incorrect.
> > > > >
> > > > > Fix this bug by using current fsuid/fsgid to do underlying fs's link().
> > > > >
> > > > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220817102951.xnvesg3a7rbv576x@wittgenstein/T
> > > > >
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Zhang Tianci <zhangtianci.1997@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Jiachen Zhang <zhangjiachen.jaycee@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > > ---
> > > > > fs/overlayfs/dir.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
> > > > > fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 2 ++
> > > > > 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> > > > >
> > > > > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> > > > > index 6b03457f72bb..dd84e6fc5f6e 100644
> > > > > --- a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> > > > > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> > > > > @@ -595,8 +595,8 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
> > > > > err = -ENOMEM;
> > > > > override_cred = prepare_creds();
> > > > > if (override_cred) {
> > > > > - override_cred->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
> > > > > - override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
> > > > > + override_cred->fsuid = attr->fsuid;
> > > > > + override_cred->fsgid = attr->fsgid;
> > > > > if (!attr->hardlink) {
> > > > > err = security_dentry_create_files_as(dentry,
> > > > > attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred,
> > > > > @@ -646,6 +646,8 @@ static int ovl_create_object(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t rdev,
> > > > > inode_init_owner(&init_user_ns, inode, dentry->d_parent->d_inode, mode);
> > > > > attr.mode = inode->i_mode;
> > > > >
> > > > > + attr.fsuid = inode->i_uid;
> > > > > + attr.fsgid = inode->i_gid;
> > > > > err = ovl_create_or_link(dentry, inode, &attr, false);
> > > > > /* Did we end up using the preallocated inode? */
> > > > > if (inode != d_inode(dentry))
> > > > > @@ -702,6 +704,7 @@ static int ovl_link(struct dentry *old, struct inode *newdir,
> > > > > {
> > > > > int err;
> > > > > struct inode *inode;
> > > > > + struct ovl_cattr attr;
> > > > >
> > > > > err = ovl_want_write(old);
> > > > > if (err)
> > > > > @@ -728,9 +731,12 @@ static int ovl_link(struct dentry *old, struct inode *newdir,
> > > > > inode = d_inode(old);
> > > > > ihold(inode);
> > > > >
> > > > > - err = ovl_create_or_link(new, inode,
> > > > > - &(struct ovl_cattr) {.hardlink = ovl_dentry_upper(old)},
> > > > > - ovl_type_origin(old));
> > > > > + attr = (struct ovl_cattr) {
> > > > > + .hardlink = ovl_dentry_upper(old),
> > > > > + .fsuid = current_fsuid(),
> > > > > + .fsgid = current_fsgid(),
> > > > > + };
> > > >
> > > > Why do we need to override fsuid/fsgid for the hardlink case?
> > > >
> > > > Wouldn't it be simpler to just use the mounter's creds unmodified in
> > > > this case? The inode is not created in this case, so overriding with
> > > > current uid/gid is not necessary, I think.
> > > >
> > > > Another way to look at it is: rename(A, B) is equivalent to an
> > > > imaginary atomic [link(A, B) + unlink(A)] pair. But we don't override
> > > > uid/gid for rename() or unlink() so why should we for link().
> > >
> > > So my assumption has been that we want to override for any creation
> > > request and so for the sake of consistency I would've expected to also
> > > use that for ->link().
> >
> > But link() is *not* a creation op. It's a namespace manipulation op.
>
> Yeah, I know what you mean but it's borderline in so far as the
> underlying fs might still perform permission checking based on the
> caller's fs{g,u}id which together with what I'm saying below in a bit
> was what made me go oh well, we should use the caller's fs{g,u}id then
> for consistency.
>
> >
> > > Plus, this is also what has been done before the
> > > commit 51f7e52dc943 ("ovl: share inode for hard link") iiuc.
> >
> > It wouldn't have mattered back then either, since the upper inode was
> > linked and not copied.
>
> What I meant was back then even for link the fs{g,u}id was based on a
> newly allocated inode->i_{g,u}id that was initialized through
> inode_init_owner() with the caller's fs{g,u}id:
>
> inode = ovl_new_inode(dentry->d_sb, mode);
> if (!inode)
> goto out;
>
> err = ovl_copy_up(dentry->d_parent);
> if (err)
> goto out_iput;
>
> inode_init_owner(inode, dentry->d_parent->d_inode, mode);
> stat.mode = inode->i_mode;
>
> old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
> err = -ENOMEM;
> override_cred = prepare_creds();
> if (override_cred) {
> override_cred->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
> override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
>
> and it changed after that commit to be based on old inode. So emulating
> the old behavior seemed the better approach.
>
> >
> > > Fwiw, I would've opted for consistency and even use the caller's
> > > fs{g,u}id during ->rename() and ->unlink().
> > >
> > > Right now the caller's fs{g,u}id - indirectly through inode_init_owner()
> > > - is used to ensure that the ownership of newly created files in the
> > > upper layer are based on the caller's not on the mounter's fs{g,u}id
> > > afaict. If we continue to only override for those cases it would really
> > > help that we document this in a good comment in ovl_create_or_link().
> >
> > Yep.
>
> Sounds good.
It looks like you've reached an agreement.
So I will send the v3 patch using the mounter's fs{g,u}id with the
proper comment in ovl_create_or_link().
Thanks,
Tianci
