On Tue, Dec 8, 2020 at 2:53 PM Amir Goldstein <amir73il@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2020 at 6:36 PM Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH is required by open_by_handle_at(2) so check it in > > ovl_decode_real_fh() as well to prevent privilege escalation for > > unprivileged overlay mounts. > > > > Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@xxxxxxxxxx> > > --- > > fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 3 +++ > > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) > > > > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c > > index a6162c4076db..82a55fdb1e7a 100644 > > --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c > > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c > > @@ -156,6 +156,9 @@ struct dentry *ovl_decode_real_fh(struct ovl_fh *fh, struct vfsmount *mnt, > > struct dentry *real; > > int bytes; > > > > + if (!capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)) > > + return NULL; > > + > > If the mounter is not capable in init ns, ovl_check_origin() and > ovl_verify_index() > will not function as expected and this will break index and nfs export features. NFS export is clear-cut. Hard link indexing should work without fh decoding, since it is only encoding the file handle to search for the index entry, and encoding is not privileged. Not sure how ovl_verify_index will choke on that, will have to try... but worse case we just need to disable verification. And yeah, using .overlay.origin attribute for inode number consistency won't work either, but it should fail silently (which is probably a good thing). Haven't tested this yet, though. Thanks, Miklos
