Re: [PATCH][V2] overlayfs: During copy up, first copy up data and then xattrs

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On Fri, Jan 11, 2019 at 12:29 AM Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> If a file with capability set (and hence security.capability xattr) is
> written kernel clears security.capability xattr. For overlay, during file
> copy up if xattrs are copied up first and then data is, copied up. This
> means data copy up will result in clearing of security.capability xattr
> file on lower has. And this can result into surprises. If
> a lower file has CAP_SETUID, then it should not be cleared over
> copy up (if nothing was actually written to file).
>
> This also creates problems with chown logic where it first copies up file
> and then tries to clear setuid bit. But by that time security.capability
> xattr is already gone (due to data copy up), and caller gets -ENODATA.
> This has been reported by Giuseppe here.
>
> https://github.com/containers/libpod/issues/2015#issuecomment-447824842
>
> Fix this by copying up data first and then metadta. This is a regression
> which has been introduced by my commit as part of metadata only copy up
> patches.
>
> TODO: There will be some corner cases where a file is copied up metadata
>       only and later data copy up happens and that will clear
>       security.capability xattr. Something needs to be done about that too.
>
> Fixes: bd64e57586d3 ("ovl: During copy up, first copy up metadata and then data")
> Reported-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>  fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c |   30 +++++++++++++++++-------------
>  1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>
> Index: rhvgoyal-linux/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> ===================================================================
> --- rhvgoyal-linux.orig/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c  2018-11-28 08:45:58.122478207 -0500
> +++ rhvgoyal-linux/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c       2019-01-10 13:29:05.997079686 -0500
> @@ -443,6 +443,23 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_inode(struct ovl_
>  {
>         int err;
>
> +       /*
> +        * Copy up data first and then xattrs. Writing data after
> +        * xattrs will remove security.capability xattr automatically.
> +        */
> +       if (S_ISREG(c->stat.mode) && !c->metacopy) {
> +               struct path upperpath, datapath;
> +
> +               ovl_path_upper(c->dentry, &upperpath);
> +               BUG_ON(upperpath.dentry != NULL);
> +               upperpath.dentry = temp;
> +
> +               ovl_path_lowerdata(c->dentry, &datapath);
> +               err = ovl_copy_up_data(&datapath, &upperpath, c->stat.size);
> +               if (err)
> +                       return err;
> +       }
> +

I know you just moved this code around, but please change it to
if (WARN_ON(...)) return -EIO;

If it was up to me, I would change the call arguments to:
              err = ovl_copy_up_data(c, temp);

and compose the paths inside ovl_copy_up_data().
There are more similarities to both call sites than there are differences.

Thanks,
Amir.



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