On Thu, Apr 26, 2018 at 4:13 PM, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 12, 2018 at 05:08:00PM +0200, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
>
> [..]
>> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/file.c b/fs/overlayfs/file.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..a0b606885c41
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/file.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
>> +/*
>> + * Copyright (C) 2017 Red Hat, Inc.
>> + *
>> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
>> + * under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as published by
>> + * the Free Software Foundation.
>> + */
>> +
>> +#include <linux/cred.h>
>> +#include <linux/file.h>
>> +#include <linux/xattr.h>
>> +#include "overlayfs.h"
>> +
>> +static struct file *ovl_open_realfile(const struct file *file)
>> +{
>> + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
>> + struct inode *upperinode = ovl_inode_upper(inode);
>> + struct inode *realinode = upperinode ?: ovl_inode_lower(inode);
>> + struct file *realfile;
>> + const struct cred *old_cred;
>> +
>> + old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
>> + realfile = path_open(&file->f_path, file->f_flags | O_NOATIME,
>> + realinode, current_cred(), false);
>> + revert_creds(old_cred);
>> +
>> + pr_debug("open(%p[%pD2/%c], 0%o) -> (%p, 0%o)\n",
>> + file, file, upperinode ? 'u' : 'l', file->f_flags,
>> + realfile, IS_ERR(realfile) ? 0 : realfile->f_flags);
>> +
>> + return realfile;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int ovl_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
>> +{
>> + struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
>
> Hi Miklos,
>
> There is one thing I can't wrap my head around, so I better ask.
>
> file_dentry() will call ovl_d_real() and try to find dentry based on
> inode installed in f->f_inode. If ovl_d_real() can't find inode dentry
> matching the passed in inode, it warns.
>
> Assume, I have a stacked overlay configuration. Let me call top level
> overlay layer ovl1 and lower level overlay layer ovl2. Say I open a
> file foo.txt. Now ovl_open() in ovl1 decides that realinode is a lower
> inode and installs that inode f->f_inode of realfile. (This should be
> ovl2 layer inode, let me call it ovl2_inode). Now ovl_open() of ovl2 layer
> will be called and it will call file_dentry() and will look for dentry
> corresponding to ovl2_inode. I am wondering what if a copy up of foo.txt
> was triggered in ovl1 and by the time we called ovl_d_real(dentry,
> ovl2_inode), it will start comparing with inode of ovl1_upper and never
> find ovl2_inode.
Okay, so we've modified ovl_d_real() to allow returning the overlay
dentry itself. This is important: when we fail to match ovl1_upper
with ovl2_inode, well go on to get ovl2_dentry and call d_real()
recursively. That recursive call should match the inode, return it to
outer ovl_d_real(), which again will match the inode and return
without warning.
> IOW, I am not able to figure out how do we protect agains copy up races
> when ovl_open() calls file_dentry().
Racing with a copy up cannot matter, since we'll continue looking for
the inode in the layers and stacks below, regardless of whether we
checked the upper dentry or not.
Does that make it clearer?
Thanks,
Miklos
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