On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 4:41 PM, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Wed, Mar 07, 2018 at 10:21:30AM +0200, Amir Goldstein wrote: >> On Tue, Mar 6, 2018 at 10:54 PM, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> > When a metacopy file is no longer a metacopy and data has been copied up, >> > remove REDIRECT xattr. Its not needed anymore. >> > >> > Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@xxxxxxxxxx> >> > --- >> > fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 9 +++++++++ >> > 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) >> > >> > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c >> > index 0c8d2755bd25..704febd2e2fa 100644 >> > --- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c >> > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c >> > @@ -775,6 +775,15 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_meta_inode_data(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c) >> > if (err) >> > return err; >> > >> > + /* >> > + * A metacopy files does not need redirect xattr once data has >> > + * been copied up. >> > + */ >> > + err = vfs_removexattr(upperpath.dentry, OVL_XATTR_REDIRECT); >> > + if (err && err != -ENODATA && err != -EOPNOTSUPP) >> > + return err; >> > + >> > + err = 0; >> > ovl_set_upperdata(d_inode(c->dentry)); >> > return err; >> >> By intuition, I would say that removing redirect should be done after setting >> upperdata flag. Not sure if it really matters in real life. >> Maybe when racing a lookup of a metacopy hardlink and copy up data of >> an upper alias? >> >> Also, it would make sense to also ovl_dentry_set_redirect(c->dentry, NULL) >> probably use a helper ovl_clear_redirect() for the locking. >> >> But that highlights a serious problem with current patches - >> Access to OVL_I(inode)->redirect is protected with parent mutex in ovl_lookup() > >> and additionally with dentry->d_lock in ovl_rename() >> That is sufficient for directories which can only have a single dentry >> alias to an >> inode but not at all sufficient for non-directories. > > Quick question on this. For non-dir files, will ovl_inode->redirect be > protected by VFS locking. Atleast for our use case. We seem to be touching > ovl_inode->redirect in rename, link and lookup path. > > VFS rename locks both source and destination inodes and link path will > lock source and destination as well. So I think a rename and link can > not make progress in parallel if any or the source or target is files > are common. If that's the case two redirect writers can't stomp over > each other. > > Lookup path will only set ovl_inode->redirect only if inode state is > I_NEW and that means other vfs operations on same inode could not be > making any progress. > > Now comes question of copy up path when we remove redirect xattr and > modify ovl_inode->redirect. I don't know if we can assume that > VFS is holding inode lock when copy up happens. If this assumption is > valid, then it means rename and link can't make progress and it is > safe to modify ovl_inode->redirect. > > I guess this assumption might not be valid, and that's why we need > ovl_inode->lock. Not sure though. Can you throw some light at it. > copy up from open() file for write doesn't hold any VFS lock. I guess before your metacopy changes, it would have been safe to set redirect without ovl_inode lock if we would only take the patch to move setting redirect into I_NEW, but anyway, if for no other reason, it is good practice to also protect multiple access in overlayfs layer, unless there is a good reason to rely on VFS locks. Thanks, Amir. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-unionfs" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html