Re: [PATCH 5/7] SELinux: Handle opening of a unioned file

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Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> It looks like commit 415103f9932d45f7927f4b17e3a9a13834cdb9a1 changed
> selinux_inode_init_security()'s handling of SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT,
> and this change was never propagated to selinux_dentry_init_security().
>  However, that commit also did not update
> security/selinux/hooks.c:may_create()'s logic for computing the new file
> label when checking CREATE permission, and therefore introduced a
> potential inconsistency between the label used for the permission check
> and the label assigned to the inode.
> 
> That's why I suggested that we need a common helper for all three to
> ensure consistency there.

Ah, okay.  I didn't realise selinux_dentry_init_security() wasn't supposed to
be so different.

David
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