The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 2c93762ec4b3ab66980ee7aaffde1e050bfbf291
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/2c93762ec4b3ab66980ee7aaffde1e050bfbf291
Author: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@xxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Wed, 08 Jan 2025 14:24:42 -06:00
Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
CommitterDate: Fri, 28 Feb 2025 12:39:17 +01:00
x86/bugs: Relocate mds/taa/mmio/rfds defines
Move the mds, taa, mmio, and rfds mitigation enums earlier in the file to
prepare for restructuring of these mitigations as they are all inter-related.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250108202515.385902-3-david.kaplan@xxxxxxx
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 5397d0a..4269ed1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -247,6 +247,37 @@ static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
[MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV] = "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
};
+enum taa_mitigations {
+ TAA_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+ TAA_MITIGATION_VERW,
+ TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED,
+};
+
+/* Default mitigation for TAA-affected CPUs */
+static enum taa_mitigations taa_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_TAA) ? TAA_MITIGATION_VERW : TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
+
+enum mmio_mitigations {
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW,
+};
+
+/* Default mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
+static enum mmio_mitigations mmio_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ? MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW : MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
+
+enum rfds_mitigations {
+ RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW,
+ RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+};
+
+/* Default mitigation for Register File Data Sampling */
+static enum rfds_mitigations rfds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS) ? RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW : RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+
static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
@@ -290,16 +321,6 @@ early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "TAA: " fmt
-enum taa_mitigations {
- TAA_MITIGATION_OFF,
- TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
- TAA_MITIGATION_VERW,
- TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED,
-};
-
-/* Default mitigation for TAA-affected CPUs */
-static enum taa_mitigations taa_mitigation __ro_after_init =
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_TAA) ? TAA_MITIGATION_VERW : TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
static bool taa_nosmt __ro_after_init;
static const char * const taa_strings[] = {
@@ -390,15 +411,6 @@ early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MMIO Stale Data: " fmt
-enum mmio_mitigations {
- MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF,
- MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
- MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW,
-};
-
-/* Default mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
-static enum mmio_mitigations mmio_mitigation __ro_after_init =
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ? MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW : MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
static bool mmio_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
static const char * const mmio_strings[] = {
@@ -487,16 +499,6 @@ early_param("mmio_stale_data", mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline);
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Register File Data Sampling: " fmt
-enum rfds_mitigations {
- RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
- RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW,
- RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
-};
-
-/* Default mitigation for Register File Data Sampling */
-static enum rfds_mitigations rfds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS) ? RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW : RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
-
static const char * const rfds_strings[] = {
[RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
[RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW] = "Mitigation: Clear Register File",
|