The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 72c70f480a70695523f984651d5da766b862c712
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/72c70f480a70695523f984651d5da766b862c712
Author: Breno Leitao <leitao@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Mon, 29 Jul 2024 09:40:56 -07:00
Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
CommitterDate: Tue, 30 Jul 2024 14:51:11 +02:00
x86/bugs: Add a separate config for Spectre V2
Currently, the CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is halfway populated,
where some mitigations have entries in Kconfig, and they could be
modified, while others mitigations do not have Kconfig entries, and
could not be controlled at build time.
Create an entry for the Spectre V2 CPU mitigation under
CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS. This allow users to enable or disable
it at compilation time.
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240729164105.554296-9-leitao@xxxxxxxxxx
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 9 +++++----
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 22d3245..33e125a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2716,6 +2716,18 @@ config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V1
memory access bounds check.
See also <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst>
+config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2
+ bool "Mitigate SPECTRE V2 hardware bug"
+ default y
+ help
+ Enable mitigation for Spectre V2 (Branch Target Injection). Spectre
+ V2 is a class of side channel attacks that takes advantage of
+ indirect branch predictors inside the processor. In Spectre variant 2
+ attacks, the attacker can steer speculative indirect branches in the
+ victim to gadget code by poisoning the branch target buffer of a CPU
+ used for predicting indirect branch addresses.
+ See also <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst>
+
config MITIGATION_SRBDS
bool "Mitigate Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) hardware bug"
depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 8292a96..45cbc6f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1452,17 +1452,18 @@ static void __init spec_v2_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
{
- enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd;
char arg[20];
int ret, i;
+ cmd = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2) ? SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO : SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") ||
cpu_mitigations_off())
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
if (ret < 0)
- return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ return cmd;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) {
if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option))
@@ -1472,8 +1473,8 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
}
if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) {
- pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
- return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to default mode\n", arg);
+ return cmd;
}
if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE ||
|