The following commit has been merged into the x86/pti branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 767d46ab566dd489733666efe48732d523c8c332
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/767d46ab566dd489733666efe48732d523c8c332
Author: Balbir Singh <sblbir@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Wed, 29 Jul 2020 10:11:03 +10:00
Committer: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CommitterDate: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 15:08:03 +02:00
Documentation: Add L1D flushing Documentation
Add documentation of l1d flushing, explain the need for the
feature and how it can be used.
Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <sblbir@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200729001103.6450-6-sblbir@xxxxxxxxxx
---
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 +-
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1d_flush.rst | 70 ++++++++++++++++-
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 17 ++++-
Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst | 8 ++-
4 files changed, 96 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1d_flush.rst
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
index ca4dbdd..21710f8 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
@@ -15,3 +15,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
tsx_async_abort
multihit.rst
special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
+ l1d_flush.rst
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1d_flush.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1d_flush.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..adc4ecc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1d_flush.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+L1D Flushing
+============
+
+With an increasing number of vulnerabilities being reported around data
+leaks from the Level 1 Data cache (L1D) the kernel provides an opt-in
+mechanism to flush the L1D cache on context switch.
+
+This mechanism can be used to address e.g. CVE-2020-0550. For applications
+the mechanism keeps them safe from vulnerabilities, related to leaks
+(snooping of) from the L1D cache.
+
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+The following CVEs can be addressed by this
+mechanism
+
+ ============= ======================== ==================
+ CVE-2020-0550 Improper Data Forwarding OS related aspects
+ ============= ======================== ==================
+
+Usage Guidelines
+----------------
+
+Please see document: :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst` for
+details.
+
+**NOTE**: The feature is disabled by default, applications need to
+specifically opt into the feature to enable it.
+
+Mitigation
+----------
+
+When PR_SET_L1D_FLUSH is enabled for a task a flush of the L1D cache is
+performed when the task is scheduled out and the incoming task belongs to a
+different process and therefore to a different address space.
+
+If the underlying CPU supports L1D flushing in hardware, the hardware
+mechanism is used, software fallback for the mitigation, is not supported.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The kernel command line allows to control the L1D flush mitigations at boot
+time with the option "l1d_flush_out=". The valid arguments for this option are:
+
+ ============ =============================================================
+ off Disables the prctl interface, applications trying to use
+ the prctl() will fail with an error
+ ============ =============================================================
+
+By default the API is enabled and applications opt-in by by using the prctl
+API.
+
+Limitations
+-----------
+
+The mechanism does not mitigate L1D data leaks between tasks belonging to
+different processes which are concurrently executing on sibling threads of
+a physical CPU core when SMT is enabled on the system.
+
+This can be addressed by controlled placement of processes on physical CPU
+cores or by disabling SMT. See the relevant chapter in the L1TF mitigation
+document: :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst <smt_control>`.
+
+**NOTE** : Checks have been added to ensure that the prctl API associated
+with the opt-in will work only when the task affinity of the task opting
+in, is limited to cores running in non-SMT mode. The same checks are made
+when L1D is flushed. Changing the affinity after opting in, would result
+in flushes not working on cores that are in non-SMT mode.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index a106874..0c3f315 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2295,6 +2295,23 @@
feature (tagged TLBs) on capable Intel chips.
Default is 1 (enabled)
+ l1d_flush_out= [X86,INTEL]
+ Control mitigation for L1D based snooping vulnerability.
+
+ Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an exploit against CPU
+ internal buffers which can forward information to a
+ disclosure gadget under certain conditions.
+
+ In vulnerable processors, the speculatively
+ forwarded data can be used in a cache side channel
+ attack, to access data to which the attacker does
+ not have direct access.
+
+ This parameter controls the mitigation. The
+ options are:
+
+ off - Unconditionally disable the mitigation
+
l1tf= [X86] Control mitigation of the L1TF vulnerability on
affected CPUs
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
index 7ddd8f6..f39744e 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
@@ -106,3 +106,11 @@ Speculation misfeature controls
* prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
* prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
* prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);
+
+- PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH_OUT: Flush L1D Cache on context switch out of the task
+ (works only when tasks run on non SMT cores)
+
+ Invocations:
+ * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH_OUT, 0, 0, 0);
+ * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH_OUT, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
+ * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH_OUT, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
|