The following commit has been merged into the x86/entry branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 3ea11ac991d594728e5df42f7eb1145072b9c2bc
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/3ea11ac991d594728e5df42f7eb1145072b9c2bc
Author: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Mon, 24 Feb 2020 13:24:58 +01:00
Committer: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CommitterDate: Fri, 15 May 2020 20:03:03 +02:00
x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on cpu_entry_area
A data breakpoint near the top of an IST stack will cause unrecoverable
recursion. A data breakpoint on the GDT, IDT, or TSS is terrifying.
Prevent either of these from happening.
Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@xxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@xxxxxxxxxx>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200505134058.272448010@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
---
arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c b/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
index 4d8d53e..d42fc0e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
@@ -227,10 +227,35 @@ int arch_check_bp_in_kernelspace(struct arch_hw_breakpoint *hw)
return (va >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) || ((va + len - 1) >= TASK_SIZE_MAX);
}
+/*
+ * Checks whether the range from addr to end, inclusive, overlaps the CPU
+ * entry area range.
+ */
+static inline bool within_cpu_entry_area(unsigned long addr, unsigned long end)
+{
+ return end >= CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE &&
+ addr < (CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE + CPU_ENTRY_AREA_TOTAL_SIZE);
+}
+
static int arch_build_bp_info(struct perf_event *bp,
const struct perf_event_attr *attr,
struct arch_hw_breakpoint *hw)
{
+ unsigned long bp_end;
+
+ bp_end = attr->bp_addr + attr->bp_len - 1;
+ if (bp_end < attr->bp_addr)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Prevent any breakpoint of any type that overlaps the
+ * cpu_entry_area. This protects the IST stacks and also
+ * reduces the chance that we ever find out what happens if
+ * there's a data breakpoint on the GDT, IDT, or TSS.
+ */
+ if (within_cpu_entry_area(attr->bp_addr, bp_end))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
hw->address = attr->bp_addr;
hw->mask = 0;
|