The following commit has been merged into the locking/kcsan branch of tip:
Commit-ID: bbfa112b46bdbbdfc2f5bfb9c2dcbef780ff6417
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/bbfa112b46bdbbdfc2f5bfb9c2dcbef780ff6417
Author: Will Deacon <will@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Mon, 11 May 2020 21:41:42 +01:00
Committer: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CommitterDate: Tue, 12 May 2020 11:04:13 +02:00
READ_ONCE: Simplify implementations of {READ,WRITE}_ONCE()
The implementations of {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() suffer from a significant
amount of indirection and complexity due to a historic GCC bug:
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58145
which was originally worked around by 230fa253df63 ("kernel: Provide
READ_ONCE and ASSIGN_ONCE").
Since GCC 4.8 is fairly vintage at this point and we emit a warning if
we detect it during the build, return {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() to their former
glory with an implementation that is easier to understand and, crucially,
more amenable to optimisation. A side effect of this simplification is
that WRITE_ONCE() no longer returns a value, but nobody seems to be
relying on that and the new behaviour is aligned with smp_store_release().
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@xxxxxxxxxx>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200511204150.27858-11-will@xxxxxxxxxx
---
include/linux/compiler.h | 141 ++++++++++++++------------------------
1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler.h b/include/linux/compiler.h
index 9bd0f76..1b4e64d 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler.h
@@ -177,28 +177,57 @@ void ftrace_likely_update(struct ftrace_likely_data *f, int val,
# define __UNIQUE_ID(prefix) __PASTE(__PASTE(__UNIQUE_ID_, prefix), __LINE__)
#endif
-#include <uapi/linux/types.h>
+/*
+ * Prevent the compiler from merging or refetching reads or writes. The
+ * compiler is also forbidden from reordering successive instances of
+ * READ_ONCE and WRITE_ONCE, but only when the compiler is aware of some
+ * particular ordering. One way to make the compiler aware of ordering is to
+ * put the two invocations of READ_ONCE or WRITE_ONCE in different C
+ * statements.
+ *
+ * These two macros will also work on aggregate data types like structs or
+ * unions.
+ *
+ * Their two major use cases are: (1) Mediating communication between
+ * process-level code and irq/NMI handlers, all running on the same CPU,
+ * and (2) Ensuring that the compiler does not fold, spindle, or otherwise
+ * mutilate accesses that either do not require ordering or that interact
+ * with an explicit memory barrier or atomic instruction that provides the
+ * required ordering.
+ */
+#include <asm/barrier.h>
+#include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
#include <linux/kcsan-checks.h>
-#define __READ_ONCE_SIZE \
+#define __READ_ONCE(x) (*(volatile typeof(x) *)&(x))
+
+#define READ_ONCE(x) \
({ \
- switch (size) { \
- case 1: *(__u8 *)res = *(volatile __u8 *)p; break; \
- case 2: *(__u16 *)res = *(volatile __u16 *)p; break; \
- case 4: *(__u32 *)res = *(volatile __u32 *)p; break; \
- case 8: *(__u64 *)res = *(volatile __u64 *)p; break; \
- default: \
- barrier(); \
- __builtin_memcpy((void *)res, (const void *)p, size); \
- barrier(); \
- } \
+ typeof(x) *__xp = &(x); \
+ kcsan_check_atomic_read(__xp, sizeof(*__xp)); \
+ __kcsan_disable_current(); \
+ ({ \
+ typeof(x) __x = __READ_ONCE(*__xp); \
+ __kcsan_enable_current(); \
+ smp_read_barrier_depends(); \
+ __x; \
+ }); \
})
+#define WRITE_ONCE(x, val) \
+do { \
+ typeof(x) *__xp = &(x); \
+ kcsan_check_atomic_write(__xp, sizeof(*__xp)); \
+ __kcsan_disable_current(); \
+ *(volatile typeof(x) *)__xp = (val); \
+ __kcsan_enable_current(); \
+} while (0)
+
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
/*
- * We can't declare function 'inline' because __no_sanitize_address confilcts
+ * We can't declare function 'inline' because __no_sanitize_address conflicts
* with inlining. Attempt to inline it may cause a build failure.
- * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=67368
+ * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=67368
* '__maybe_unused' allows us to avoid defined-but-not-used warnings.
*/
# define __no_kasan_or_inline __no_sanitize_address notrace __maybe_unused
@@ -225,78 +254,26 @@ void ftrace_likely_update(struct ftrace_likely_data *f, int val,
#define __no_sanitize_or_inline __always_inline
#endif
-static __no_kcsan_or_inline
-void __read_once_size(const volatile void *p, void *res, int size)
-{
- kcsan_check_atomic_read(p, size);
- __READ_ONCE_SIZE;
-}
-
static __no_sanitize_or_inline
-void __read_once_size_nocheck(const volatile void *p, void *res, int size)
+unsigned long __read_once_word_nocheck(const void *addr)
{
- __READ_ONCE_SIZE;
-}
-
-static __no_kcsan_or_inline
-void __write_once_size(volatile void *p, void *res, int size)
-{
- kcsan_check_atomic_write(p, size);
-
- switch (size) {
- case 1: *(volatile __u8 *)p = *(__u8 *)res; break;
- case 2: *(volatile __u16 *)p = *(__u16 *)res; break;
- case 4: *(volatile __u32 *)p = *(__u32 *)res; break;
- case 8: *(volatile __u64 *)p = *(__u64 *)res; break;
- default:
- barrier();
- __builtin_memcpy((void *)p, (const void *)res, size);
- barrier();
- }
+ return __READ_ONCE(*(unsigned long *)addr);
}
/*
- * Prevent the compiler from merging or refetching reads or writes. The
- * compiler is also forbidden from reordering successive instances of
- * READ_ONCE and WRITE_ONCE, but only when the compiler is aware of some
- * particular ordering. One way to make the compiler aware of ordering is to
- * put the two invocations of READ_ONCE or WRITE_ONCE in different C
- * statements.
- *
- * These two macros will also work on aggregate data types like structs or
- * unions. If the size of the accessed data type exceeds the word size of
- * the machine (e.g., 32 bits or 64 bits) READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() will
- * fall back to memcpy(). There's at least two memcpy()s: one for the
- * __builtin_memcpy() and then one for the macro doing the copy of variable
- * - '__u' allocated on the stack.
- *
- * Their two major use cases are: (1) Mediating communication between
- * process-level code and irq/NMI handlers, all running on the same CPU,
- * and (2) Ensuring that the compiler does not fold, spindle, or otherwise
- * mutilate accesses that either do not require ordering or that interact
- * with an explicit memory barrier or atomic instruction that provides the
- * required ordering.
+ * Use READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() instead of READ_ONCE() if you need to load a
+ * word from memory atomically but without telling KASAN/KCSAN. This is
+ * usually used by unwinding code when walking the stack of a running process.
*/
-#include <asm/barrier.h>
-#include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
-
-#define __READ_ONCE(x, check) \
+#define READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(x) \
({ \
- union { typeof(x) __val; char __c[1]; } __u; \
- if (check) \
- __read_once_size(&(x), __u.__c, sizeof(x)); \
- else \
- __read_once_size_nocheck(&(x), __u.__c, sizeof(x)); \
- smp_read_barrier_depends(); /* Enforce dependency ordering from x */ \
- __u.__val; \
+ unsigned long __x; \
+ compiletime_assert(sizeof(x) == sizeof(__x), \
+ "Unsupported access size for READ_ONCE_NOCHECK()."); \
+ __x = __read_once_word_nocheck(&(x)); \
+ smp_read_barrier_depends(); \
+ __x; \
})
-#define READ_ONCE(x) __READ_ONCE(x, 1)
-
-/*
- * Use READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() instead of READ_ONCE() if you need
- * to hide memory access from KASAN.
- */
-#define READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(x) __READ_ONCE(x, 0)
static __no_kasan_or_inline
unsigned long read_word_at_a_time(const void *addr)
@@ -305,14 +282,6 @@ unsigned long read_word_at_a_time(const void *addr)
return *(unsigned long *)addr;
}
-#define WRITE_ONCE(x, val) \
-({ \
- union { typeof(x) __val; char __c[1]; } __u = \
- { .__val = (__force typeof(x)) (val) }; \
- __write_once_size(&(x), __u.__c, sizeof(x)); \
- __u.__val; \
-})
-
/**
* data_race - mark an expression as containing intentional data races
*
|