thought you folks would find this of interest.
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2000 06:07:36 -0400
From: Eric K. Dickinson <eric@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reply-To: eric_dickinson at nih.gov
To: laurel linux <laurellinux at linuxweb.org>
Subject: [LaurelLinux] [Fwd: ftpd: the advisory version]
Roger Fajman wrote:
>
> == Forwarded Mail ==
>
> Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2000 09:18:22 -0000
> From: Lamagra Argamal <lamagra at HACKERMAIL.NET>
> Subject: ftpd: the advisory version
> To: BUGTRAQ at SECURITYFOCUS.COM
>
> You might have seen the wuftpd exploit by tf8, he released it in his own lame way. But now I bring you the story behind it.
>
> The story begins inside the ftpcmd.y file. Which has the ftp commands in it.
> The bug is in the site_exec(char *cmd) function. There is calls lreply(200,cmd);
> In ftpd.c we find
>
> void lreply(int n, char *fmt,...)
> ....
> vreply(USE_REPLY_LONG, n, fmt, ap)
> ...
>
> and
> void vreply(long flags, int n, char *fmt, va_list ap)
> ...
> vsnprintf(buf + (n ? 4 : 0), n ? sizeof(buf) - 4 : sizeof(buf), fmt, ap)
> ....
>
> cmd becomes fmt with vsnprintf that's bad. The idea is to put in formatstrings to get some extra priviledges.
> We can use %n to overwrite some stuff. eg. overwrite a ret-address or a null at the end of a buffer (cause an overflow) or change the configuration or uid like I did in my proftp exploit (check proftp_pcc.c on Packetstorm).
>
> There are some other bugs in site_exec like
> for (t = cmd; *t && !isspace(*t); t++) {
> if (isupper(*t)) {
> *t = tolower(*t);
> }
> }
>
> Sanitizing stops at a space?? (good thing I didn't tell you this, eh tf8)
>
> Wuftpd is all really buggy code. I prefer proftpd, it has clean, readable code and it's quite secure.
> I did some checking and found some minor bugs there too
>
> First in modules/mod_pam.c
> /* Allocate our entries...we don't free this because PAM does this for us.
> */
> pam_user = malloc(strlen(cmd->argv[0]) + 1);
> if(pam_user == (char *)0)
> return pam_return_type ? ERROR(cmd) : DECLINED(cmd);
> sstrncpy(pam_user, cmd->argv[0], strlen(cmd->argv[0]) + 1);
>
> pam_pass = malloc(strlen(cmd->argv[1]) + 1);
>
> Pam doesn't free these according to me. So this could lead to a pottential system DoS if abused. Fortunatly proftpd has a limit of 3 on USER/PASS.
>
> Second:
> In the set_proc_title(char *fmt,...) function in main.c
> It constructs a buffer with hostname + user + cmd to replace argv[0]. If setproctitle(char *fmt,...) is available (only on debian and bsd).
> It calls setproctitle(statsbuf); what re-opens the old bug
> Not a big thing since almost nobody has it.
>
> -lamagra
> http://lamagra.seKure.de
> http://roothat.labs.pulltheplug.com
>
> Send someone a cool Dynamitemail flashcard greeting!! And get rewarded.
> GO AHEAD! http://cards.dynamitemail.com/index.php3?rid=fc-41
--
Eric K. Dickinson CNE, MCSE, GNU/Linux Geek
http://dexter.dyndns.com
NRA Indoor Pistol Master
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