On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 10:36 PM, kbuild test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Hi Andrey, > > Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve: > > [auto build test ERROR on mmotm/master] > [also build test ERROR on v4.18-rc1 next-20180620] > [if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help improve the system] > > url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Andrey-Konovalov/khwasan-kernel-hardware-assisted-address-sanitizer/20180621-035912 > base: git://git.cmpxchg.org/linux-mmotm.git master > config: x86_64-randconfig-x011-201824 (attached as .config) > compiler: gcc-7 (Debian 7.3.0-16) 7.3.0 > reproduce: > # save the attached .config to linux build tree > make ARCH=x86_64 > > Note: the linux-review/Andrey-Konovalov/khwasan-kernel-hardware-assisted-address-sanitizer/20180621-035912 HEAD 0e30ed7118e854b38bb6ab96365e7c74a2518290 builds fine. > It only hurts bisectibility. Will fix in v4, thanks! > > All errors (new ones prefixed by >>): > >>> mm//kasan/report.c:42:20: error: conflicting types for 'find_first_bad_addr' > static const void *find_first_bad_addr(const void *addr, size_t size) > ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > In file included from mm//kasan/report.c:33:0: > mm//kasan/kasan.h:130:7: note: previous declaration of 'find_first_bad_addr' was here > void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size); > ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ >>> mm//kasan/report.c:54:13: error: conflicting types for 'addr_has_shadow' > static bool addr_has_shadow(struct kasan_access_info *info) > ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > In file included from mm//kasan/report.c:33:0: > mm//kasan/kasan.h:120:20: note: previous definition of 'addr_has_shadow' was here > static inline bool addr_has_shadow(const void *addr) > ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > mm//kasan/report.c: In function 'get_shadow_bug_type': > mm//kasan/report.c:86:2: error: duplicate case value > case KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE: > ^~~~ > mm//kasan/report.c:85:2: note: previously used here > case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE: > ^~~~ > mm//kasan/report.c:98:2: error: duplicate case value > case KASAN_FREE_PAGE: > ^~~~ > mm//kasan/report.c:85:2: note: previously used here > case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE: > ^~~~ > mm//kasan/report.c:99:2: error: duplicate case value > case KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE: > ^~~~ > mm//kasan/report.c:85:2: note: previously used here > case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE: > ^~~~ > mm//kasan/report.c: At top level: >>> mm//kasan/report.c:128:20: error: static declaration of 'get_bug_type' follows non-static declaration > static const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info) > ^~~~~~~~~~~~ > In file included from mm//kasan/report.c:33:0: > mm//kasan/kasan.h:131:13: note: previous declaration of 'get_bug_type' was here > const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info); > ^~~~~~~~~~~~ > > vim +/find_first_bad_addr +42 mm//kasan/report.c > > 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 41 > 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 @42 static const void *find_first_bad_addr(const void *addr, size_t size) > 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 43 { > 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 44 u8 shadow_val = *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr); > 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 45 const void *first_bad_addr = addr; > 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 46 > 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 47 while (!shadow_val && first_bad_addr < addr + size) { > 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 48 first_bad_addr += KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE; > 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 49 shadow_val = *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(first_bad_addr); > 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 50 } > 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 51 return first_bad_addr; > 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 52 } > 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 53 > 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 @54 static bool addr_has_shadow(struct kasan_access_info *info) > 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 55 { > 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 56 return (info->access_addr >= > 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 57 kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START)); > 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 58 } > 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 59 > 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 60 static const char *get_shadow_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info) > 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 61 { > 0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 62 const char *bug_type = "unknown-crash"; > cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 63 u8 *shadow_addr; > 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 64 > 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 65 info->first_bad_addr = find_first_bad_addr(info->access_addr, > 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 66 info->access_size); > 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 67 > cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 68 shadow_addr = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(info->first_bad_addr); > 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 69 > cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 70 /* > cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 71 * If shadow byte value is in [0, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) we can look > cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 72 * at the next shadow byte to determine the type of the bad access. > cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 73 */ > cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 74 if (*shadow_addr > 0 && *shadow_addr <= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1) > cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 75 shadow_addr++; > cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 76 > cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 77 switch (*shadow_addr) { > 0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 78 case 0 ... KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1: > cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 79 /* > cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 80 * In theory it's still possible to see these shadow values > cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 81 * due to a data race in the kernel code. > cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 82 */ > 0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 83 bug_type = "out-of-bounds"; > b8c73fc2 Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 84 break; > 0316bec2 Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 85 case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE: > 0316bec2 Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 86 case KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE: > 0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 87 bug_type = "slab-out-of-bounds"; > 0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 88 break; > bebf56a1 Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 89 case KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE: > 0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 90 bug_type = "global-out-of-bounds"; > 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 91 break; > c420f167 Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 92 case KASAN_STACK_LEFT: > c420f167 Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 93 case KASAN_STACK_MID: > c420f167 Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 94 case KASAN_STACK_RIGHT: > c420f167 Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 95 case KASAN_STACK_PARTIAL: > 0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 96 bug_type = "stack-out-of-bounds"; > 0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 97 break; > 0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 98 case KASAN_FREE_PAGE: > 0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 @99 case KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE: > 0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 100 bug_type = "use-after-free"; > c420f167 Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 101 break; > 828347f8 Dmitry Vyukov 2016-11-30 102 case KASAN_USE_AFTER_SCOPE: > 828347f8 Dmitry Vyukov 2016-11-30 103 bug_type = "use-after-scope"; > 828347f8 Dmitry Vyukov 2016-11-30 104 break; > 342061ee Paul Lawrence 2018-02-06 105 case KASAN_ALLOCA_LEFT: > 342061ee Paul Lawrence 2018-02-06 106 case KASAN_ALLOCA_RIGHT: > 342061ee Paul Lawrence 2018-02-06 107 bug_type = "alloca-out-of-bounds"; > 342061ee Paul Lawrence 2018-02-06 108 break; > 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 109 } > 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 110 > 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 111 return bug_type; > 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 112 } > 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 113 > 822d5ec2 Colin Ian King 2017-07-10 114 static const char *get_wild_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info) > 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 115 { > 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 116 const char *bug_type = "unknown-crash"; > 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 117 > 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 118 if ((unsigned long)info->access_addr < PAGE_SIZE) > 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 119 bug_type = "null-ptr-deref"; > 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 120 else if ((unsigned long)info->access_addr < TASK_SIZE) > 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 121 bug_type = "user-memory-access"; > 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 122 else > 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 123 bug_type = "wild-memory-access"; > 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 124 > 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 125 return bug_type; > 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 126 } > 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 127 > 7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 @128 static const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info) > 7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 129 { > 7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 130 if (addr_has_shadow(info)) > 7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 131 return get_shadow_bug_type(info); > 7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 132 return get_wild_bug_type(info); > 7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 133 } > 7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 134 > > :::::: The code at line 42 was first introduced by commit > :::::: 0b24becc810dc3be6e3f94103a866f214c282394 kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure > > :::::: TO: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@xxxxxxxxxxx> > :::::: CC: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > --- > 0-DAY kernel test infrastructure Open Source Technology Center > https://lists.01.org/pipermail/kbuild-all Intel Corporation > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "kasan-dev" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to kasan-dev+unsubscribe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. > To post to this group, send email to kasan-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/kasan-dev/201806210451.tOaA22Qm%25fengguang.wu%40intel.com. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-sparse" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
