Somehow I managed to compose and not send these comments; sorry.
Christopher Li wrote:
> This patch add the kmalloc null pointer checking. It also
> try to track the double free as well. It knows a few kmalloc like
> functions and kfree etc.
Overall, this patch looks good, and I really like the idea of doing malloc
checking with Sparse. I have a few comments, interspersed below.
The main issue, however: I can't seem to get it to generate any warnings.
I've tried running it on the following program, and it produces nothing:
#include <stdlib.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int *i = malloc(sizeof(int));
return *i;
}
Shouldn't this program provoke some warnings? And could you supply some
test code which does provoke warnings?
Also, you need a new warning switch to control each of these two checks.
> The interrupt checking is just a toy. Without cross function checking,
> it is way too many false positive.
I don't mind including it in an early stage, defaulting to off.
> --- sparse.orig/checker.h 2007-01-16 11:13:28.000000000 -0800
> +++ sparse/checker.h 2007-01-16 11:57:29.000000000 -0800
> @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
> +#ifndef _CHECKER_H_
> +#define _CHECKER_H_
> +
> +struct blob {
> + int len;
size_t len, please.
> + unsigned char data[0];
> +};
[...]
> --- sparse.orig/expand.c 2007-01-16 11:13:18.000000000 -0800
> +++ sparse/expand.c 2007-01-16 11:13:28.000000000 -0800
> @@ -29,8 +29,8 @@
> /* Random cost numbers */
> #define SIDE_EFFECTS 10000 /* The expression has side effects */
> #define UNSAFE 100 /* The expression may be "infinitely costly" due to exceptions */
> -#define SELECT_COST 20 /* Cut-off for turning a conditional into a select */
> -#define BRANCH_COST 10 /* Cost of a conditional branch */
> +#define SELECT_COST 0 /* Cut-off for turning a conditional into a select */
> +#define BRANCH_COST 0 /* Cost of a conditional branch */
OK, I *think* that won't cause any harm.
> --- sparse.orig/sparse.c 2007-01-16 11:13:18.000000000 -0800
> +++ sparse/sparse.c 2007-01-16 11:13:28.000000000 -0800
> };
[...]
> static void check_call_instruction(struct instruction *insn)
> {
> pseudo_t fn = insn->func;
> - struct ident *ident;
> - static const struct checkfn check_fn[] = {
> + static const struct checkfn *entry, check_fn[] = {
> { &memset_ident, check_memset },
> { &memcpy_ident, check_memcpy },
> { ©_to_user_ident, check_ctu },
> { ©_from_user_ident, check_cfu },
> + { NULL },
> };
> - int i;
>
> if (fn->type != PSEUDO_SYM)
> return;
> - ident = fn->sym->ident;
> - if (!ident)
> - return;
> - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(check_fn)/sizeof(struct checkfn) ; i++) {
> - if (check_fn[i].id != ident)
> - continue;
> - check_fn[i].check(insn);
> - break;
> - }
> + entry = match_function(check_fn, fn->sym);
> + if (entry)
> + entry->check(insn);
> }
Why this change, to use a NULL-terminated iteration rather than a counted
iteration? I don't see the benefit.
> @@ -211,14 +213,19 @@ enum opcode {
>
> /* Needed to translate SSA back to normal form */
> OP_COPY,
> + OP_LAST,
> };
Hmmm...
> --- sparse.orig/check-interrupt.c 2007-01-16 11:13:28.000000000 -0800
> +++ sparse/check-interrupt.c 2007-01-16 11:13:28.000000000 -0800
[...]
> +enum {
> + OP_CLI = OP_LAST,
> + OP_STI,
> + OP_RESTORE,
> +};
Ouch. This will break if anything else attempts to extend the opcode list
in the same way.
Have you considered attempting to express interrupts as another form of
context? Now that the basic framework for multiple types of context exists,
perhaps you could treat interrupts as another kind of context?
> +static inline void scan_interrupt_insn(struct entrypoint *ep)
> +{
> + struct basic_block *bb;
> + struct instruction *insn;
> +
> + FOR_EACH_PTR(ep->bbs, bb) {
> + struct bb_state *bbs = bb->state;
> + FOR_EACH_PTR(bb->insns, insn) {
> + if (!insn->bb)
> + continue;
> + if (insn->opcode == OP_RET) {
> + add_instruction(&bbs->insns, insn);
> + continue;
> + }
> + else if (insn->opcode != OP_ASM)
> + continue;
> + if (!strcmp(insn->string, "cli"))
> + add_instruction(&bbs->insns, checker_instruction(insn, OP_CLI, NULL));
> + else if (!strcmp(insn->string, "sti"))
> + add_instruction(&bbs->insns, checker_instruction(insn, OP_STI, NULL));
> + else if (!strcmp(insn->string, "pushl %0 ; popfl"))
> + add_instruction(&bbs->insns, checker_instruction(insn, OP_RESTORE, NULL));
Ouch. x86-specific, and specific to the exact strings from the Linux inline
assembly.
We really need the metalanguage part of Engler's paper that you referenced.
This kind of thing seems reasonable for random scripts written to check
particular problems and interpreted by Sparse, but not for code going into
Sparse itself.
Also, modifying the instructions in bbs seems like it would conflict with the
use of other checkers, due to the enum collision described above.
[...]
> +enum {
> + OP_DEF_PTR = OP_LAST,
> + OP_USE_PTR,
> + OP_FREE_PTR
> +};
Same problem as above.
> +static inline void execute_pointer_usage(struct instruction *insn)
> +{
> + if (reg_state(insn->src) & PTR_NULL)
> + warning(insn->pos, "funcion %s possible using NULL pointer",
> + show_ident(insn->bb->ep->name->ident));
s/funcion/function/; s/possible/possibly/.
> + if (reg_state(insn->src) & PTR_FREE)
> + warning(insn->pos, "funcion %s possible using pointer after free",
> + show_ident(insn->bb->ep->name->ident));
Likewise.
> +static inline void execute_pointer_free(struct instruction *insn)
> +{
> + if (reg_state(insn->src) & PTR_FREE)
> + warning(insn->pos, "funcion %s possible double free pointer",
> + show_ident(insn->bb->ep->name->ident));
Likewise.
> + if (bbs->branch) {
> + struct instruction *br = bbs->branch;
> + unsigned char orig = reg_state(br->cond);
> + check_bb_cond(br->bb_true, br->cond, orig & ~PTR_NULL);
> + check_bb_cond(br->bb_false, br->cond, orig & ~PTR_NOTNULL);
*Awesome*.
Something like this might work for conditional locking primitives, too.
> +void init_check_null_ptr(void)
> +{
> + static const char *malloc_name[] = {
> + "malloc",
> + "__kmalloc",
> + "__kmalloc_node",
> + "__kzalloc",
> + "kmem_cache_alloc",
> + "kmem_cache_zalloc",
> + "kmem_cache_alloc_node",
> + "vmalloc",
> + "vmalloc_user",
> + "vmalloc_node",
> + "vmalloc_32",
> + "vmalloc_32_user",
> + "__vmalloc",
> + NULL,
> + };
> + static const char *free_name[] = {
> + "free",
> + "kfree",
> + "kmem_cache_free",
> + "vfree",
> + NULL,
> + };
Idea for future work (not for this patch): we might want to make sure that
memory allocated with a given malloc gets freed with a given free.
> + static const char *noret[] = {
> + "panic",
> + NULL,
> + };
We already have __attribute__((noreturn)); please use that rather than
matching against a list here.
- Josh Triplett
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