Hi Jarkko,
On 12/10/2021 11:37 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
On Mon, 2021-12-06 at 13:18 -0800, Reinette Chatre wrote:
Hi Jarkko,
On 12/4/2021 2:43 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
On Wed, Dec 01, 2021 at 11:23:02AM -0800, Reinette Chatre wrote:
By default a write page fault on a present PTE inherits the permissions
of the VMA. Enclave page permissions maintained in the hardware's
Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM) may change after a VMA accessing the page
is created. A VMA's permissions may thus exceed the enclave page
permissions even though the VMA was originally created not to exceed
the enclave page permissions. Following the default behavior during
a page fault on a present PTE while the VMA permissions exceed the
enclave page permissions would result in the PTE for an enclave page
to be writable even though the page is not writable according to the
enclave's permissions.
Consider the following scenario:
* An enclave page exists with RW EPCM permissions.
* A RW VMA maps the range spanning the enclave page.
* The enclave page's EPCM permissions are changed to read-only.
How could this happen in the existing mainline code?
This is a preparatory patch for SGX2 support. Restricting the
permissions of an enclave page would require OS support that is added in
a later patch.
* There is no page table entry for the enclave page.
Q.
What will user space observe when an attempt is made to write to the
enclave page from within the enclave?
A.
Initially the page table entry is not present so the following is
observed:
1) Instruction writing to enclave page is run from within the enclave.
2) A page fault with second and third bits set (0x6) is encountered
and handled by the SGX handler sgx_vma_fault() that installs a
read-only page table entry following previous patch that installs
page table entry with permissions that VMA and enclave agree on
(read-only in this case).
3) Instruction writing to enclave page is re-attempted.
4) A page fault with first three bits set (0x7) is encountered and
transparently (from SGX and user space perspective) handled by the
OS with the page table entry made writable because the VMA is
writable.
5) Instruction writing to enclave page is re-attempted.
6) Since the EPCM permissions prevents writing to the page a new page
fault is encountered, this time with the SGX flag set in the error
code (0x8007). No action is taken by OS for this page fault and
execution returns to user space.
7) Typically such a fault will be passed on to an application with a
signal but if the enclave is entered with the vDSO function provided
by the kernel then user space does not receive a signal but instead
the vDSO function returns successfully with exception information
(vector=14, error code=0x8007, and address) within the exception
fields within the vDSO function's struct sgx_enclave_run.
As can be observed it is not possible for user space to write to an
enclave page if that page's enclave page permissions do not allow so,
no matter what the VMA or PTE allows.
Even so, the OS should not allow writing to a page if that page is not
writable. Thus the page table entry should accurately reflect the
enclave page permissions.
Do not blindly accept VMA permissions on a page fault due to a write
attempt to a present PTE. Install a pfn_mkwrite() handler that ensures
that the VMA permissions agree with the enclave permissions in this
regard.
Considering the same scenario as above after this change results in
the following behavior change:
Q.
What will user space observe when an attempt is made to write to the
enclave page from within the enclave?
A.
Initially the page table entry is not present so the following is
observed:
1) Instruction writing to enclave page is run from within the enclave.
2) A page fault with second and third bits set (0x6) is encountered
and handled by the SGX handler sgx_vma_fault() that installs a
read-only page table entry following previous patch that installs
page table entry with permissions that VMA and enclave agree on
(read-only in this case).
3) Instruction writing to enclave page is re-attempted.
4) A page fault with first three bits set (0x7) is encountered and
passed to the pfn_mkwrite() handler for consideration. The handler
determines that the page should not be writable and returns SIGBUS.
5) Typically such a fault will be passed on to an application with a
signal but if the enclave is entered with the vDSO function provided
by the kernel then user space does not receive a signal but instead
the vDSO function returns successfully with exception information
(vector=14, error code=0x7, and address) within the exception fields
within the vDSO function's struct sgx_enclave_run.
The accurate exception information supports the SGX runtime, which is
virtually always implemented inside a shared library, by providing
accurate information in support of its management of the SGX enclave.
This QA-format is not a great idea, as it kind of tells what are the legit
questions to ask.
I will remove the QA-format and just describe the two (before/after)
scenarios.
You should describe what the patch does and what are the
legit reasons for doing that. Unfortunately, in the current form it is very
hard to get grip of this patch.
That was the goal of the summary (the first paragraph) at the start of
the changelog. Could you please elaborate how you would like me to
improve it?
If I do a search "mktme" through the commit message, it gives
me zero results.
Could you please elaborate why you expect "mktme" to show up in the
commit message?
Reinette
