On Mon, Sep 28, 2020 at 11:07:47AM -0700, H.J. Lu wrote: > On Mon, Sep 28, 2020 at 9:44 AM Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > On 28/09/2020 01:58, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > On Fri, Sep 25, 2020 at 07:23:59PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote: > > >> On 15/09/2020 12:28, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > >>> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S > > >>> new file mode 100644 > > >>> index 000000000000..adbd59d41517 > > >>> --- /dev/null > > >>> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S > > >>> @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ > > >>> +SYM_FUNC_START(__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave) > > >>> <snip> > > >>> +.Lretpoline: > > >>> + call 2f > > >>> +1: pause > > >>> + lfence > > >>> + jmp 1b > > >>> +2: mov %rax, (%rsp) > > >>> + ret > > >> I hate to throw further spanners in the work, but this is not compatible > > >> with CET, and the user shadow stack work in progress. > > > CET goes beyond my expertise. Can you describe, at least rudimentary, > > > how this code is not compatible? > > > > CET Shadow Stacks detect attacks which modify the return address on the > > stack. > > > > Retpoline *is* a ROP gadget. It really does modify the return address > > on the stack, even if its purpose is defensive (vs Spectre v2) rather > > than malicious. > > > > >> Whichever of these two large series lands first is going to inflict > > >> fixing this problem on the other. > > >> > > >> As the vdso text is global (to a first approximation), it must not be a > > >> retpoline if any other process is liable to want to use CET-SS. > > > Why is that? > > > > Because when CET-SS is enabled, the ret will suffer a #CP exception > > (return address on the stack not matching the one recorded in the shadow > > stack), which I presume/hope is wired into SIGSEGV. > > > > Here is the CET compatible retpoline: > > endbr64 > /* Check if shadow stack is in use. NB: R11 is the only usable > scratch register for function calls. */ > xorl %r11d, %r11d > rdsspq %r11 > testq %r11, %r11 > jnz 3f > call 2f > 1: > pause > lfence > jmp 1b > 2: > mov %rax, (%rsp) > ret > 3: > /* Shadow stack is in use. Make the indirect call. */ > call *%rax > ret Right, so I have actually two alternatives: this and boot time patching: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/9/25/1122 /Jarkko
