On Tue, Jun 16, 2020 at 10:55:11PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Fri, Jun 05, 2020 at 09:09:49PM +0100, Darren Kenny wrote: > > TYPO: s/devilering/delivering/? > > I decided to rewrite the whole thing: > > x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation > > Provisioning Certification Enclave (PCE), the root of trust for other > enclaves, generates a signing key from a fused key called Provisioning > Certification Key. PCE can then use this key to certify an attestation key > of a QE, e.g. we get the chain of trust down to the hardware if the Intel > signed PCE is used. > > To use the needed keys, ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY is required but should be > only allowed for those who actually need it so that only the trusted > parties can certify QE's. > > Obviously the attestation service should know the public key of the used > PCE and that way detect illegit attestation, but whitelisting the legit > users still adds an additional layer of defence. > > Add new device file called /dev/sgx/provision. The sole purpose of this > file is to provide file descriptors that act as privilege tokens to allow > to build enclaves with ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY set. A new ioctl called > SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE is used to assign this token to an enclave. I also refined Documentation/x86/sgx.rst based on this in my tree [*]. [*] https://github.com/jsakkine-intel/linux-sgx.git /Jarkko
