On Fri, 2019-08-23 at 03:39 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Thu, 2019-08-22 at 09:34 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Thu, Aug 22, 2019 at 07:31:39PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > On Wed, 2019-08-21 at 20:55 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > > Why are we validating the TCS protection bits? Hardware ignores them, so
> > > > why do we care? sgx_ioc_enclave_add_page() sets the internal protection
> > > > bits so there's no danger of putting the wrong thing in the page tables.
> > >
> > > I think that in this commit I got it wrong but I think this is awkward:
> > >
> > > /*
> > > * TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO
> > > * permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided
> > > * values and silently overwrites with zero permissions.
> > > */
> > > if ((secinfo.flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS)
> > > prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
> > >
> > > In my opinion the right thing to do would be check that SECINFO has *at
> > > minimum* RW and return -EINVAL if not.
> >
> > Based on Serge's comment, hardware updates MRENCLAVE with SECINFO *after*
> > it overwrites the flags for TCS pages. I.e. requiring RW for the TCS
> > would result in every enclave failing EINIT due to an invalid measurement.
> > It'd be fairly easy to verify this if we want to triple check that that is
> > indeed hardware behavior.
>
> This is from the signing tool that I wrote back in 2016 used in the
> selftest:
>
> struct mreadd {
> uint64_t tag;
> uint64_t offset;
> uint64_t flags; /* SECINFO flags */
> uint8_t reserved[40];
> } __attribute__((__packed__));
>
> static bool mrenclave_eadd(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint64_t offset, uint64_t flags)
> {
> struct mreadd mreadd;
>
> memset(&mreadd, 0, sizeof(mreadd));
> mreadd.tag = MREADD;
> mreadd.offset = offset;
> mreadd.flags = flags;
>
> return mrenclave_update(ctx, &mreadd);
> }
>
> If MRENCLAVE was updated after the overwrite, this would not work.
>
> The least confusing semantics would be to require RW, no more or less.
OK, it is how Serge said.
This can we verified from the SDM easily (SCRATCH_SECINFO gets zeros
is extended after that).
And also from my signing tool :-)
for (offset = 0; offset < sb.st_size; offset += 0x1000) {
if (!offset)
flags = SGX_SECINFO_TCS;
else
flags = SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_R |
SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_X;
OK, so this looks like that my patch does exactly the right thing,
right?
/Jarkko
