On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 08:43:43AM -0600, Dr. Greg wrote: > I believe it is a silent response to the issues we were prosecuting > 4-5 weeks ago, regarding the requirement for an SGX driver on an FLC > hardware platform to have some semblance of policy management to be > relevant from a security/privacy perspective. It would have certainly > been collegial to include a reference to our discussions and concerns > in the changelog. > > See 364f68f5a3c in Jarkko's next/master. > > The changeset addresses enclave access to the PROVISION key but is > still insufficient to deliver guarantees that are consistent with the > SGX security model. In order to achieve that, policy management needs > to embrace the use of MRSIGNER values, which is what our SFLC patchset > uses. > > The noted changeset actually implements most of the 'kernel bloat' > that our SFLC patchset needs to bolt onto. > > As of yesterday afternoon next/master still won't initialize a > non-trivial enclave. Since there now appears to be a wholesale change > in the driver architecture and UAPI we are sitting on the sidelines > waiting for an indication all of that has some hope of working before > we introduce our approach. > > Part of SFLC won't be popular but it is driven by clients who are > actually paying for SGX security engineering and architectures. How many of these people are actually posting here? /Jarkko
