On Tue, Oct 08, 2019 at 11:28:32PM +0800, Xin Long wrote: > On Tue, Oct 8, 2019 at 9:02 PM David Laight <David.Laight@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > From: Xin Long > > > Sent: 08 October 2019 12:25 > > > > > > This is a sockopt defined in section 7.3 of rfc7829: "Exposing > > > the Potentially Failed Path State", by which users can change > > > pf_expose per sock and asoc. > > > > If I read these patches correctly the default for this sockopt in 'enabled'. > > Doesn't this mean that old application binaries will receive notifications > > that they aren't expecting? > > > > I'd have thought that applications would be required to enable it. > If we do that, sctp_getsockopt_peer_addr_info() in patch 2/5 breaks. > I don't think we can safely do either of these things. Older applications still need to behave as they did prior to the introduction of this notification, and we shouldn't allow unexpected notifications to be sent. What if you added a check in get_peer_addr_info to only return -EACCESS if pf_expose is 0 and the application isn't subscribed to the PF event? Neil > > > > David > > > > - > > Registered Address Lakeside, Bramley Road, Mount Farm, Milton Keynes, MK1 1PT, UK > > Registration No: 1397386 (Wales) > > >
