Hi Marcelo, I guess I worked on an old version of the kernel. I will re-submit the patch. Sorry :( Wenwen On Wed, May 2, 2018 at 6:23 PM, Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Hi Wenwen, > > On Wed, May 02, 2018 at 05:12:45PM -0500, Wenwen Wang wrote: >> In sctp_setsockopt_maxseg(), the integer 'val' is compared against min_len >> and max_len to check whether it is in the appropriate range. If it is not, >> an error code -EINVAL will be returned. This is enforced by a security >> check. But, this check is only executed when 'val' is not 0. In fact, if > > Which makes sense, no? Especially if considering that 0 should be an > allowed value as it turns off the user limit. > >> 'val' is 0, it will be assigned with a new value (if the return value of >> the function sctp_id2assoc() is not 0) in the following execution. However, >> this new value of 'val' is not checked before it is used to assigned to > > Which 'new value'? val is not set to something new during the > function. It always contains the user supplied value. > >> asoc->user_frag. That means it is possible that the new value of 'val' >> could be out of the expected range. This can cause security issues >> such as buffer overflows, e.g., the new value of 'val' is used as an index >> to access a buffer. >> >> This patch inserts a check for the new value of 'val' to see if it is in >> the expected range. If it is not, an error code -EINVAL will be returned. >> >> Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@xxxxxxx> >> --- >> net/sctp/socket.c | 21 ++++++++++----------- >> 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c >> index 80835ac..2beb601 100644 >> --- a/net/sctp/socket.c >> +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c >> @@ -3212,6 +3212,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_maxseg(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval, unsigned >> struct sctp_af *af = sp->pf->af; >> struct sctp_assoc_value params; >> struct sctp_association *asoc; >> + int min_len, max_len; >> int val; >> >> if (optlen == sizeof(int)) { >> @@ -3231,19 +3232,15 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_maxseg(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval, unsigned >> return -EINVAL; >> } >> >> - if (val) { >> - int min_len, max_len; >> + min_len = SCTP_DEFAULT_MINSEGMENT - af->net_header_len; >> + min_len -= af->ip_options_len(sk); >> + min_len -= sizeof(struct sctphdr) + >> + sizeof(struct sctp_data_chunk); > > On which tree did you base your patch on? Your patch lacks a tag so it > defaults to net-next, and I reworked this section on current net-next > and these MTU calculcations are now handled by sctp_mtu_payload(). > > But even for net tree, I don't understand which issue you're fixing > here. Actually it seems to me that both codes seems to do the same > thing. > >> >> - min_len = SCTP_DEFAULT_MINSEGMENT - af->net_header_len; >> - min_len -= af->ip_options_len(sk); >> - min_len -= sizeof(struct sctphdr) + >> - sizeof(struct sctp_data_chunk); >> + max_len = SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN - sizeof(struct sctp_data_chunk); >> >> - max_len = SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN - sizeof(struct sctp_data_chunk); >> - >> - if (val < min_len || val > max_len) >> - return -EINVAL; >> - } >> + if (val && (val < min_len || val > max_len)) >> + return -EINVAL; >> >> asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, params.assoc_id); >> if (asoc) { >> @@ -3253,6 +3250,8 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_maxseg(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval, unsigned >> val -= sizeof(struct sctphdr) + >> sctp_datachk_len(&asoc->stream); >> } >> + if (val < min_len || val > max_len) >> + return -EINVAL; >> asoc->user_frag = val; >> asoc->frag_point = sctp_frag_point(asoc, asoc->pathmtu); >> } else { >> -- >> 2.7.4 >> >> -- >> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-sctp" in >> the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx >> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html >> -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-sctp" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html