On 07/22/2014 09:22 AM, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> Jason reported an oops caused by SCTP on his ARM machine with
> SCTP authentication enabled:
>
> Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM
> CPU: 0 PID: 104 Comm: sctp-test Not tainted 3.13.0-68744-g3632f30c9b20-dirty #1
> task: c6eefa40 ti: c6f52000 task.ti: c6f52000
> PC is at sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0xc4/0x10c
> LR is at sg_init_table+0x20/0x38
> pc : [<c024bb80>] lr : [<c00f32dc>] psr: 40000013
> sp : c6f538e8 ip : 00000000 fp : c6f53924
> r10: c6f50d80 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00010000
> r7 : 00000000 r6 : c7be4000 r5 : 00000000 r4 : c6f56254
> r3 : c00c8170 r2 : 00000001 r1 : 00000008 r0 : c6f1e660
> Flags: nZcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
> Control: 0005397f Table: 06f28000 DAC: 00000015
> Process sctp-test (pid: 104, stack limit = 0xc6f521c0)
> Stack: (0xc6f538e8 to 0xc6f54000)
> [...]
> Backtrace:
> [<c024babc>] (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0249af8>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x33c/0x5c8)
> [<c02497bc>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c023e96c>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x7fc/0x844)
> [<c023e170>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x0/0x844) from [<c023ef78>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x24/0x28)
> [<c023ef54>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x0/0x28) from [<c0234364>] (sctp_side_effects+0x1134/0x1220)
> [<c0233230>] (sctp_side_effects+0x0/0x1220) from [<c02330b0>] (sctp_do_sm+0xac/0xd4)
> [<c0233004>] (sctp_do_sm+0x0/0xd4) from [<c023675c>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x118/0x160)
> [<c0236644>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x0/0x160) from [<c023d5bc>] (sctp_inq_push+0x6c/0x74)
> [<c023d550>] (sctp_inq_push+0x0/0x74) from [<c024a6b0>] (sctp_rcv+0x7d8/0x888)
>
> While we already had various kind of bugs in that area
> ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if
> we/peer is AUTH capable") and b14878ccb7fa ("net: sctp: cache
> auth_enable per endpoint"), this one is a bit of a different
> kind.
>
> Giving a bit more background on why SCTP authentication is
> needed can be found in RFC4895:
>
> SCTP uses 32-bit verification tags to protect itself against
> blind attackers. These values are not changed during the
> lifetime of an SCTP association.
>
> Looking at new SCTP extensions, there is the need to have a
> method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by
> the original peer that started the association and not by a
> malicious attacker.
>
> To cause this bug, we're triggering an INIT collision between
> peers; normal SCTP handshake where both sides intent to
> authenticate packets contains RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO
> parameters that are being negotiated among peers:
>
> ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
> <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
> -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
>
> RFC4895 says that each endpoint therefore knows its own random
> number and the peer's random number *after* the association
> has been established. The local and peer's random number along
> with the shared key are then part of the secret used for
> calculating the HMAC in the AUTH chunk.
>
> Now, in our scenario, we have 2 threads with 1 non-blocking
> SEQ_PACKET socket each, setting up common shared SCTP_AUTH_KEY
> and SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY properly, and each of them calling
> sctp_bindx(3), listen(2) and connect(2) against each other,
> thus the handshake looks similar to this, e.g.:
>
> ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
> <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
> <--------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -----------
> -------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -------->
> ...
>
> Since such collisions can also happen with verification tags,
> the RFC4895 for AUTH rather vaguely says under section 6.1:
>
> In case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling
> of this Random Number follow the same pattern as those for
> the Verification Tag, as explained in Section 5.2.4 of
> RFC 2960 [5]. Therefore, each endpoint knows its own Random
> Number and the peer's Random Number after the association
> has been established.
>
> In RFC2960, section 5.2.4, we're eventually hitting Action B:
>
> B) In this case, both sides may be attempting to start an
> association at about the same time but the peer endpoint
> started its INIT after responding to the local endpoint's
> INIT. Thus it may have picked a new Verification Tag not
> being aware of the previous Tag it had sent this endpoint.
> The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED
> state but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from
> the State Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may
> running and send a COOKIE ACK.
>
> In other words, the handling of the Random parameter is the
> same as behavior for the Verification Tag as described in
> Action B of section 5.2.4.
>
> Looking at the code, we exactly hit the sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b()
> case which triggers an SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC command to the
> side effect interpreter, and in fact it properly copies over
> peer_{random, hmacs, chunks} parameters from the newly created
> association to update the existing one.
>
> Also, the old asoc_shared_key is being released and based on
> the new params, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() updated.
> However, the issue observed in this case is that the previous
> asoc->peer.auth_capable was 0, and has *not* been updated, so
> that instead of creating a new secret, we're doing an early
> return from the function sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key()
> leaving asoc->asoc_shared_key as NULL. However, we now have to
> authenticate chunks from the updated chunk list (e.g. COOKIE-ACK).
>
> That in fact causes the server side when responding with ...
>
> <------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ACK -----------------
>
> ... to trigger a NULL pointer dereference, since in
> sctp_packet_transmit(), it discovers that an AUTH chunk is
> being queued for xmit, and thus it calls sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
>
> Since the asoc->active_key_id is still inherited from the
> endpoint, and the same as encoded into the chunk, it uses
> asoc->asoc_shared_key, which is still NULL, as an asoc_key
> and dereferences it in ...
>
> crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, &asoc_key->data[0], asoc_key->len)
>
> ... causing an oops. All this happens because sctp_make_cookie_ack()
> called with the *new* association has the peer.auth_capable=1
> and therefore marks the chunk with auth=1 after checking
> sctp_auth_send_cid(), but it is *actually* sent later on over
> the then *updated* association's transport that didn't initialize
> its shared key due to peer.auth_capable=0. Since control chunks
> in that case are not sent by the temporary association which
> are scheduled for deletion, they are issued for xmit via
> SCTP_CMD_REPLY in the interpreter with the context of the
> *updated* association. peer.auth_capable was 0 in the updated
> association (which went from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED state),
> since all previous processing that performed sctp_process_init()
> was being done on temporary associations, that we eventually
> throw away each time.
>
> The correct fix is to update to the new peer.auth_capable
> value as well in the collision case via sctp_assoc_update(),
> so that in case the collision migrated from 0 -> 1,
> sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() can properly recalculate
> the secret. This therefore fixes the observed server panic.
>
> Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
> Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@xxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@xxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> v1 -> v2, more notes:
>
> I've only updated the commit description for now, this bug seems
> clear to me that we would need to fix it; since RFC4895 mentions
> it explicitly that on collisions, we need to *update* these params
> accordingly as we would do so in RFC2960. So in other words, this
> can be explained by having an *inconsistency* when doing the update
> as auth_capable is *tightly coupled* with peer_random, peer_chunks,
> peer_hmacs and eventually the asoc_shared_key creation.
>
> For the rest, I went through the code and currently could not
> find where we could oops if we don't have the others for now.
It don't think we'd oops specifically, but requested/supported features could
end up being disabled (like add-ip).
-vlad
> It
> needs more time and testing however. It's also not too clear from
> RFC2960/RFC4960 what needs to be carried over in addition: so we
> know "The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED state
> but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from the State
> Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may running and send
> a COOKIE ACK." and we know that we need to update all AUTH related
> members, which we do *now*.
>
> In addition, we also need to fix AUTH + COOKIE_ECHO collisions,
> as they currently cannot be resolved properly into a handshake.
>
> net/sctp/associola.c | 1 +
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>
> diff --git a/net/sctp/associola.c b/net/sctp/associola.c
> index 9de23a2..06a9ee6 100644
> --- a/net/sctp/associola.c
> +++ b/net/sctp/associola.c
> @@ -1097,6 +1097,7 @@ void sctp_assoc_update(struct sctp_association *asoc,
> asoc->c = new->c;
> asoc->peer.rwnd = new->peer.rwnd;
> asoc->peer.sack_needed = new->peer.sack_needed;
> + asoc->peer.auth_capable = new->peer.auth_capable;
> asoc->peer.i = new->peer.i;
> sctp_tsnmap_init(&asoc->peer.tsn_map, SCTP_TSN_MAP_INITIAL,
> asoc->peer.i.initial_tsn, GFP_ATOMIC);
>
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