From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@xxxxxx> Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 11:59:43 -0400 > David Miller wrote: > > From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@xxxxxx> > > Date: Sat, 21 Jun 2008 11:55:19 -0400 > > > >> The same vulnerability also exists in sctp_getsockopt_peer_addrs_old(). > >> It's a bit more difficult to trigger since there is a dependency on > >> the peer being multihomed as well, but it's still possible to cause the > >> overwrite. > > > > I can't see how that's possible. This case looks harmless to > > me. > > > > The kernel side accesses are perfectly protected. The kernel > > will only access the actual address list stored via: ... > > You are right. I didn't look far enough. Since there is no kmalloc(), > the overflow of kernel memory is not possible, and copy_to_user should > take care of any overflows of the user memory. Thanks for double-checking my analysis Vlad. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-sctp" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html