On Tue, 2010-09-07 at 15:44 -0700, Joel Becker wrote: > On Tue, Sep 07, 2010 at 05:01:01PM -0400, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote: > > > > I NAK'd this a while back. I'm willing to be convinced, but so > > > > far it remains that way. > > > > > > Hi Joel, > > > > > > Thanks for bringing this point up again. So a brief refresh on why this > > > is currently required in the fabric independent configfs handlers in > > > drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c (patch #19). > > > > Well, that is great that you mentioned your requirements. But I don't see a > > quote of Joel's concerns? Is there an LKML link for it perhaps? > > It was a while back. Essentially, the concern is that configfs > is defined to be userspace-driven. If the user asks you to remove > something, the module should be handling safe teardown rather than > rejecting the user's request. > Now, the world isn't always clean-cut. Code outside of the > filesystem representation can lay a claim on a configfs item to say "I'm > busy with this." An example is ocfs2 pinning the configfs item > describing its cluster heartbeat device. But this is ocfs2 - a > separate thing - claiming it. There is a defined API to take and > release these claims. > This API doesn't cover symlinks, as symlinks are simply linkage > between config items. It may be, as Nick suggested at the bottom of his > reply, that we want the API extended to cover that case. But he hasn't > yet convinced me that safe teardown is impossible or disasterous. > That's what I'd like to see. It's not obvious on the face of all the > file trees in the email. > Nick, can you provide some form of description, not long > pathnames, that explains a) what breaks when the symlink is removed b) > why that can't be allowed if the user is dumb enough to request it? > Hi Joel, So, the case where configfs will actually OOPs without the ->check_link() patch (or without some other internal solution) is on the unlink(2) path is when the symlink is created to a destination outside of the source struct config_group. This may have not been exactly apparent in my LIO-Target example, but here is another shot at an example without the other complexities of target mode invovled. Say we have two different struct config_subsystem in two different LKM sub_parent and sub_child. I will spare the actual mkdir(2) and ln(2) calls here, but (I hope) these are obvious: First, we start out with the parent source struct config_group from sub_parent module: /sys/kernel/config/sub_parent/group1/parent/ Next, we have a symlink from sub_parent/group1/parent to a different LKM in sub_child: /sys/kernel/config/sub_child/group1/src_0/src_link -> ../../../../sub_parent/group1/parent And then a second symlink from sub_child/group1/src_0/src_link to a sstuct config_group outside of group1, but still within sub_child: /sys/kernel/config/sub_child/group2/dst_0/dst_link -> ../../../group1/src_0/ So once the sub_child/group2/dest_0/dst_link has been created to back to sub_child/group1/src_0/src_link, the oops will appear any time that 'unlink sub_child/group1/src_0/src_link' is called while the second group2/dst_0/dst_link is still present. I don't recall the actual backtrace of the OOPs that occurs when the unlink(2) is called, but it is easily reproducable . I am really starting to think that fixing this properly below the struct config_item_operations API is going to make the most sense, but I have not realized this in a patch for fs/configfs/ just yet.. I am happy to do this in the next days if you think this would be the cleanest resolution for the above case. Thanks Joel! --nab -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-scsi" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
