On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 05:29:20PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote: > On Fri, 12 Mar 2021 at 01:59, Hector Martin <marcan@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > On 11/03/2021 23.31, Linus Walleij wrote: > > > I understand your argument, is your position such that the nature > > > of the hardware is such that community should leave this hardware > > > alone and not try to make use of RPMB for say ordinary (self-installed) > > > Linux distributions? > > > > It's not really that the community should leave this hardware alone, so > > much that I think there is a very small subset of users who will be able > > to benefit from it, and that subset will be happy with a usable > > kernel/userspace interface and some userspace tooling for this purpose, > > including provisioning and such. > > > > Consider the prerequisites for using RPMB usefully here: > > > > * You need (user-controlled) secureboot > > Agree with this prerequisite since secure boot is essential to build > initial trust in any system whether that system employs TEE, TPM, > secure elements etc. > > > * You need secret key storage - so either some kind of CPU-fused key, or > > one protected by a TPM paired with the secureboot (key sealed to PCR > > values and such) > > * But if you have a TPM, that can handle secure counters for you already > > AIUI, so you don't need RPMB > > Does TPM provide replay protected memory to store information such as: > - PIN retry timestamps? > - Hash of encrypted nvme? IMO, having replay protection for user data > on encrypted nvme is a valid use-case. > > > * So this means you must be running a non-TPM secureboot system > > > > AFAIK, there exist such systems which provide you with a hardware > crypto accelerator (like CAAM on i.Mx SoCs) that can protect your keys > (in this case RPMB key) and hence can leverage RPMB for replay > protection. > > > And so we're back to embedded platforms like Android phones and other > > SoC stuff... user-controlled secureboot is already somewhat rare here, > > and even rarer are the cases where the user controls the whole chain > > including the TEE if any (otherwise it'll be using RPMB already); this > > pretty much excludes all production Android phones except for a few > > designed as completely open systems; we're left with those and a subset > > of dev boards (e.g. the Jetson TX1 I did fuse experiments on). In the > > end, those systems will probably end up with fairly bespoke set-ups for > > any given device or SoC family, for using RPMB. > > > > But then again, if you have a full secureboot system where you control > > the TEE level, wouldn't you want to put the RPMB shenanigans there and > > get some semblance of secure TPM/keystore/attempt throttling > > functionality that is robust against Linux exploits and has a smaller > > attack surface? Systems without EL3 are rare (Apple M1 :-)) so it makes > > more sense to do this on those that do have it. If you're paranoid > > enough to be getting into building your own secure system with > > anti-rollback for retry counters, you should be heading in that directly > > anyway. > > > > And now Linux's RPMB code is useless because you're running the stack in > > the secure monitor instead :-) > > > > As Linus mentioned in other reply, there are limitations in order to > put eMMC/RPMB drivers in TEE / secure monitor such as: > - One of the design principle for a TEE is to keep its footprint as > minimal as possible like in OP-TEE we generally try to rely on Linux > for filesystem services, RPMB access etc. And currently we rely on a > user-space daemon (tee-supplicant) for RPMB access which IMO isn't as > secure as compared to direct RPMB access via kernel. > - Most embedded systems possess a single storage device (like eMMC) > for which the kernel needs to play an arbiter role. Yep exactly. This is a no-go for small embedded platforms with a single eMMC. The device *must* be in the non-secure world, so the bootloader can load the kernel/rootfs from the eMMC. If you restrain that in secure world access only, that complicates things a lot ... > > It looks like other TEE implementations such as Trusty on Android [1] > and QSEE [2] have a similar interface for RPMB access. > > So it's definitely useful for various TEE implementations to have > direct RPMB access via kernel. And while we are at it, I think it > should be useful (given replay protection benefits) to provide an > additional kernel interface to RPMB leveraging Trusted and Encrypted > Keys subsystem. As for the EFI that was mentioned earlier, newer Arm devices and the standardization behind those, is actually trying to use UEFI on most of the platforms. FWIW we already have code that manages the EFI variables in the RPMB (which is kind of irrelevant to the current discussion, just giving people a heads up). Regards /Ilias > > [1] https://android.googlesource.com/trusty/app/storage/ > [2] https://www.qualcomm.com/media/documents/files/guard-your-data-with-the-qualcomm-snapdragon-mobile-platform.pdf > > -Sumit > > > -- > > Hector Martin (marcan@xxxxxxxxx) > > Public Key: https://mrcn.st/pub
