On Sat, 2006-07-29 at 10:06 -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote: > Not so. I can (and have) written tons of CD's as a normal user, with > perfect security. But not for every CD burner ... that's the point. The heuristics we have now work for a large subset. For the rest, we get a stream of "my CD won't burn as a user like it's supposed to" bug reports. In the old days, the gnome/kde stuff simply gave the user ownership of the cd device and we allowed any command through and so all CDs worked, if not very safely. Suddenly with the new "are you root, if not I consult my allowed tables" method we get this list of CDs that can't burn as a user. > No, the kernel shouldn't allow device-specific commands. That goes without > saying. Whether this is a sg.c problem, or a cdrecord problem is > unclear, > I suspect it's the latter. There are certain CDs that just require vendor specific magic to work ... even cdrecord has no choice but to do this. In general, this allowed command list is solidifying policy in the kernel, which is the problem. If we merely put the ability to enforce policy in the kernel (without actually having any by default and allow the distros to set it via sysfs as we do now for the SCSI blacklist) then we'll go back to the old days (of every CD just works) and if there's a problem it will be a distro issue because they got their policy wrong (they're the ones who can scan a computer, see a plextor on /dev/sdc and allow certain vendor specific commands to /dev/sdc only) James - : send the line "unsubscribe linux-scsi" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
