On Thu, Jun 20, 2024 at 1:19 PM Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Thu, 2024-06-20 at 10:36 +0200, Alexander Potapenko wrote: > > On Wed, Jun 19, 2024 at 5:45 PM Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > wrote: > > > > > > put_user() uses inline assembly with precise constraints, so Clang > > > is > > > in principle capable of instrumenting it automatically. > > > Unfortunately, > > > one of the constraints contains a dereferenced user pointer, and > > > Clang > > > does not currently distinguish user and kernel pointers. Therefore > > > KMSAN attempts to access shadow for user pointers, which is not a > > > right > > > thing to do. > > > > By the way, how does this problem manifest? > > I was expecting KMSAN to generate dummy shadow accesses in this case, > > and reading/writing 1-8 bytes from dummy shadow shouldn't be a > > problem. > > > > (On the other hand, not inlining the get_user/put_user functions is > > probably still faster than retrieving the dummy shadow, so I'm fine > > either way) > > We have two problems here: not only clang can't distinguish user and > kernel pointers, the KMSAN runtime - which is supposed to clean that > up - can't do that either due to overlapping kernel and user address > spaces on s390. So the instrumentation ultimately tries to access the > real shadow. > > I forgot what the consequences of that were exactly, so I reverted the > patch and now I get: > > Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference in virtual kernel address > space > Failing address: 000003fed25fa000 TEID: 000003fed25fa403 > Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE. > AS:0000000005a70007 R3:00000000824d8007 S:0000000000000020 > Oops: 0010 ilc:2 [#1] SMP > Modules linked in: > CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: init Tainted: G B N 6.10.0-rc4- > g8aadb00f495e #11 > Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (KVM/Linux) > Krnl PSW : 0704c00180000000 000003ffe288975a (memset+0x3a/0xa0) > R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:0 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 > Krnl GPRS: 0000000000000000 000003fed25fa180 000003fed25fa180 > 000003ffe28897a6 > 0000000000000007 000003ffe0000000 0000000000000000 > 000002ee06e68190 > 000002ee06f19000 000003fed25fa180 000003ffd25fa180 > 000003ffd25fa180 > 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 000003ffe17262e0 > 0000037ee000f730 > Krnl Code: 000003ffe288974c: 41101100 la %r1,256(%r1) > 000003ffe2889750: a737fffb brctg > %r3,000003ffe2889746 > #000003ffe2889754: c03000000029 larl > %r3,000003ffe28897a6 > >000003ffe288975a: 44403000 ex %r4,0(%r3) > 000003ffe288975e: 07fe bcr 15,%r14 > 000003ffe2889760: a74f0001 cghi %r4,1 > 000003ffe2889764: b9040012 lgr %r1,%r2 > 000003ffe2889768: a784001c brc > 8,000003ffe28897a0 > Call Trace: > [<000003ffe288975a>] memset+0x3a/0xa0 > ([<000003ffe17262bc>] kmsan_internal_set_shadow_origin+0x21c/0x3a0) > [<000003ffe1725fb6>] kmsan_internal_unpoison_memory+0x26/0x30 > [<000003ffe1c1c646>] create_elf_tables+0x13c6/0x2620 > [<000003ffe1c0ebaa>] load_elf_binary+0x50da/0x68f0 > [<000003ffe18c41fc>] bprm_execve+0x201c/0x2f40 > [<000003ffe18bff9a>] kernel_execve+0x2cda/0x2d00 > [<000003ffe49b745a>] kernel_init+0x9ba/0x1630 > [<000003ffe000cd5c>] __ret_from_fork+0xbc/0x180 > [<000003ffe4a1907a>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x30 > Last Breaking-Event-Address: > [<000003ffe2889742>] memset+0x22/0xa0 > Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops > > So is_bad_asm_addr() returned false for a userspace address. > Why? Because it happened to collide with the kernel modules area: > precisely the effect of overlapping. > > VMALLOC_START: 0x37ee0000000 > VMALLOC_END: 0x3a960000000 > MODULES_VADDR: 0x3ff60000000 > Address: 0x3ffd157a580 > MODULES_END: 0x3ffe0000000 I see, thanks for the clarification! > Now the question is, why do we crash when accessing shadow for modules? > I'll need to investigate, this does not look normal. But even if that > worked, we clearly wouldn't want userspace accesses to pollute module > shadow, so I think we need this patch in its current form. Ok, it indeed makes sense. Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@xxxxxxxxxx>
