On Mon, 2023-10-23 at 16:47 +0000, Michael Kelley (LINUX) wrote:
> From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx> Sent: Thursday, October 19,
> 2023 12:13 PM
> >
> > On 10/19/23 10:05, Michael Kelley (LINUX) wrote:
> > > I'm more in favor of the "simply panic" approach. What you've
> > > done
> > > in your Patch 1 and Patch 2 is an intriguing way to try to get
> > > the memory
> > > back into a consistent state. But I'm concerned that there are
> > > failure
> > > modes that make it less than 100% foolproof (more on that
> > > below). If
> > > we can't be sure that the memory is back in a consistent state,
> > > then the
> > > original problem isn't fully solved. I'm also not sure of the
> > > value of
> > > investing effort to ensure that some errors cases are handled
> > > without
> > > panic'ing. The upside benefit of not panic'ing seems small
> > > compared to
> > > the downside risk of leaking guest VM data to the host.
> >
> > panic() should be a last resort. We *always* continue unless we
> > know
> > that something is so bad that we're going to make things worse by
> > continuing to run.
> >
> > We shouldn't panic() on the first little thing that goes wrong. If
> > folks want *that*, then they can set panic_on_warn.
> >
> > > My concern about Patches 1 and 2 is that the encryption bit in
> > > the PTE
> > > is not a reliable indicator of the state that the host thinks the
> > > page is
> > > in. Changing the state requires two steps (in either order): 1)
> > > updating
> > > the guest VM PTEs, and 2) updating the host's view of the page
> > > state.
> > > Both steps may be done on a range of pages. If #2 fails, the
> > > guest
> > > doesn't know which pages in the batch were updated and which were
> > > not, so the guest PTEs may not match the host state. In such a
> > > case,
> > > set_memory_encrypted() could succeed based on checking the
> > > PTEs when in fact the host still thinks some of the pages are
> > > shared.
> > > Such a mismatch will produce a guest panic later on if the page
> > > is
> > > referenced.
> >
> > I think that's OK. In the end, the page state is controlled by the
> > VMM.
> > The guest has zero control. All it can do is make the PTEs
> > consistent
> > and hold on for dear life. That's a general statement and not
> > specific
> > to this problem.
> >
> > In other words, it's fine for CoCo folks to be paranoid. It's fine
> > for
> > them to set panic_on_{warn,oops,whatever}=1. But it's *NOT* fine
> > to say
> > that every TDX guest will want to do that.
>
> The premise of this patch set is to not put pages on the Linux
> guest free list that are shared. I agree with that premise. But
> more precisely, the best we can do is not put pages on the free
> list where the guest PTE indicates "shared". Even if the host is
> not acting maliciously, errors can cause the guest and host to be
> out-of-sync regarding a page's private/shared status. There's no
> way to find out for sure if the host status is "private" before
> returning such a page to the free list, though if
> set_memory_encrypted() succeeds and the host is not
> malicious, we should be reasonably safe.
>
> For paranoid CoCo VM users, using panic_on_warn=1 seems
> workable. However, with current code and this patch series,
> it's possible have set_memory_decrypted() return an error and
> have set_memory_encrypted() fix things up as best it can
> without generating any warnings. It seems like we need a
> WARN or some equivalent mechanism if either of these fails,
> so that CoCo VMs can panic if they don't want to run with any
> inconsistencies (again, assuming the host isn't malicious).
Always warning seems reasonable, given the added logic around retrying.
This is something that the GHCI spec says is something that can happen
though. So the warning is kind of like "the host is being legal, but a
bit unreasonable". This will also save having to add warnings in all of
the callers, which are missing in some spots currently.
>
> Also, from a troubleshooting standpoint, panic_on_warn=1
> will make it easier to diagnose a failure of
> set_memory_encrypted()/decrypted() if it is caught
> immediately, versus putting a page with an inconsistent state
> on the free list and having things blow up later.
If the guest doesn't notify anything to the host, I wonder if there
will be scenarios where the host doesn't know that there is anything
wrong in the TD. Maybe a naive question, but do you have any insight
into how errors in guest logs might make there way to the host admin in
typical usage?
